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November 16, 2011 |  7 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

US Pivot Rests on Power, Not Weakness, of Europe

Jordan Becker: The US focus on Asia is an affirmation of the progress made over the past 65 years in Europe. Rather than worrying about abandonment, Europe should now seek to reinvest in its own independent regional security and strive to be a strong partner in the global projection of transatlantic power.

A shift in focus by the US toward the Asia-Pacific region should not be automatically construed as indicative of a weakened transatlantic partnership. In fact, much of the attention that the US lavished on its European allies (and adversaries) in the twentieth century was because Europe was a problem to be solved. As the Cannes Summit highlighted, Europe’s present sovereign debt crisis represents a global risk – but Europe is no longer perceived globally as a significant potential source of violent conflict. In this sense, a shift in US foreign policy focus away from Europe is emblematic of the many successes of the European project and the transatlantic partnership that has helped sustain it.

America’s “Pacific Century” represents an opportunity for Europe to become a more effective actor on the global stage, a long-proclaimed goal of the European project. Rather than seeking to become a pole globally, European leadership should seek to cement Europe’s role as a strong, stable pillar in a reinvigorated transatlantic security architecture. At a time when US and European leaders are focused on persistent financial crises, and as austerity measures begin to constrain defense expenditures on both sides of the Atlantic, it is time to make good on the old promises of resource pooling in the realm of defense procurement. A shift in US focus to the Pacific implies the potential for NATO to become a more equal alliance.

In spite of numerous challenges and divisions, NATO’s operations in Libya also represented an opportunity for NATO’s European pillar to take a leadership role in crisis management, albeit with indispensable aid from the US. In the case of Libya, rather than Europe being a problem for NATO to address, European NATO members were a crucial part of an imperfect solution. In order to turn this occurrence into a trend toward a more equal alliance, NATO’s European members must make their defense expenditures go further by increasing efficiencies and economies of scale through increased joint training, procurement, and operational execution – especially in the field of expeditionary operations.

During the Libya crisis, NATO served as a platform for dialogue and collective security action – for member and non-member states alike. As Secretary Clinton put it, Europe remains America’s “partner of first resort.” The US could not hope to effectively shift its focus to the Pacific absent a high degree of confidence in its European partners. In the most basic of senses, a strong European pillar in the transatlantic partnership provides the US with “strategic depth” to back its initiatives in Asia. More ambitiously, transatlantic institutions can serve both as models and as vehicles for transpacific cooperation. While the military nature of NATO may make it a less than ideal platform for institutional cooperation across the Pacific, it, and the other institutions developed in Europe in the wake of the Second World War, can serve as powerful examples of effective multilateral and regional organizations in the realms of security and economic development.

Europe’s strength as a “normative power,” if used appropriately, could serve to ease tensions surrounding the deployment of US hard power in the region, which clearly concerns China. European engagement that is complementary to US engagement could allay Chinese fears of a US-driven Southeast Asian security and economic architecture that aims to keep the US in, and the Chinese down or out. As a global economic power of the first order, and as (still) the US’s leading economic and security partner, Europe has much to offer both China and the US in America’s “Pacific Century.”

Maj. Jordan Becker is an instructor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy in West Point. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the United States Military Academy, the United States Army, or the Department of Defense.

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Unregistered User

November 18, 2011

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This a succinct summary of Europe's allegiance having evolved from well known dependency to well accepted dependency by the Europeans upon the United States. Rightly the author mentions strategic interdependecy, but it is based on the real economic interdependency and on Europe as the US "partner of first resort". It is well to cite this interdependency without rancour and note how it assists with balance of power in the Pacific.

This is therefore a felicitous update on global security realities and very well done.

 
Paul  Smyth

November 19, 2011

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Maj Jordan,

thank you for the article. I agree that as Europe has become less of a security concern the US can focus attention elsewhere. However, I'm not sure I can share your optimism!

I doubt that Europe will provide the depth of security or proposed partnership in the Far East. Why? Because 'Europe' does not exist as a single agent of policy. NATO's performance in Libya is not something all the European members of the Alliance can be proud of, some stepped up to the plate but others did not, and that was for a crisis on Europe's doorstep. Similarly, the hope that Europe will meet mandated defence expenditure is wishful thinking. It didn't happen before fiscal austerity and it certainly won't now. Even the UK and France (hitherto willing participants in military interventions) are implementing cuts. As for rationalisation of defence spending and capabilities across the continent, again I believe that is a forlorn hope. Too many national interests intrude (e.g. jobs) and multinational collaborative projects have a reputation for being late and over cost. Also, those nations with a willingness to conduct expeditionary operations which entail significant risk in blood & treasure are reluctant to hive off key capabilities when there is a suspicion that they may not be available when needed.

I suspect that burgeoning US relationships with Australia and India, plus strengthened links with other allies like Japan and Singapore will provide America with partnerships in the Far East that Europe will not.

Yours,

Paul

 
Jordan  Becker

November 19, 2011

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Paul -
Thanks for your comments. I agree with you that NATO's performance in Libya is not something that all the members of the Alliance can be proud of. But this condition is no different than at any other time in NATO's history. What is different is that European alliance members took on leading roles to a greater extent during this crisis than has previously been the case. By comparison with NATO's European members' collective performance in the Balkan crises of the 1990s, Libya looks like real progress. And Jacques Poos didn't even show up this time to raise expectations! Now, the question is if this strain broke France and the UK's capacity to project power going forward.

I've done some quantitative work on historical burden sharing in the Alliance, and I'm looking forward to crunching the Libya numbers and comparing. I'm inclined to think that even though the US played a larger role than is generally recognized, the burden of Operation Odyssey Dawn and its offshoots was shared more equally than the NATO burden has been traditionally. If this is not the case, I think your arguments will be nearly unassailable. My analysis for the time being is that the relatively high expectations that we all seem to implicitly have for Europe as a security actor are actually an indication of tremendous (and tremendously imperfect) progress. Europe's frequent failure to meet those expectations should not be a big surprise!

I share your doubts as to European states' ability to enhance or even rationalize (through pooling or "mutualization") defense spending. My current research involves assessing the role of strategic culture as a barrier (or facilitator) in this area. I'm not that far along, but I'm inclined to see it as a barrier.

By and large, I think some pessemistic evaluations of Europe's performance as a security actor reflect excessively optimistic expectations, rather than surprisingly poor performance. Those optimistic expectations have been generated by real progress, which seems to have stalled for the time being. It's not the first time tha this has happened in the history of the European project! For the sake of both American and European security, rectifying this situation is of some importance.

Clearly the US's focus has shifted to its Pacific shores and beyond. This shift in focus should send a significant message to Europe - taking care of its own business (starting with sovereign debt we should all remember) is the new normal.

My very best,
Jordan
 
Paul  Smyth

November 20, 2011

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Jordan,

thanks, hopefully this comment will only appear once!

You are right to spot where nations have made progress, my observation would be that it is not 'Europe' that has advanced but only bits of it. Could it be proffered that between Bosnia in the 90s and Libya 2011 some European states have moved backwards in terms of being reliable and active security partners? Naturally, as a Brit I'm open to accusations of bias, but I think some French & Scandinavian observers would also feel that Europe is too fragmented to be a reliable ally.

I suspect you will find statistical evidence of a shift to Europe in terms of contributions but I wouldn't lose sight of the factors behind the numbers. In Libya the Europeans didn't ask the US to take a back-seat or do less, that was a DC imposed situation. I agree that the American contribution has been down-played, it was crucial, but then so was Italy's role as a FOB. What may be difficult to quantify is to what extent the Eur effort was enabled by the US. I also think that, like MoE in a JCP, weight of effort will be a complicated matter. Fictitious example: X flew 300 missions, but Y only 200. However, X couldn't AAR and sortie duration was typically 2 hours. Y used extensive (USAF) AAR and averaged 6-hour missions. Y spent say 10 x time over target than X but was the nation with the lower sortie rate.

I concur with the (sometimes ridiculous) over-optimism in parts of NATO. I remember listening to a Eur Gen at staff college extolling the expeditionary ambitions off his (large) unit. The lack of strategic lift capab didn't seem to have registered...

Yours,

Paul

 
Jordan  Becker

November 20, 2011

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Good point Paul. I think you could argue that it hasn't been 'America' that's advanced (or not), but only bits of it as well. Europe's performance, on aggregate, I think, was better in Libya than it was in the Balkans.

You're right about the issues with measurement. It's easier in this field to measure investment than it is to measure returns on that investment, and the latter matters more than the former. In the analysis I did for data up until 2009 (and the geostatistical analysis I did in Afghanistan), I tried to follow two general rules - measure effects insofar as possible, and, to paraphrase Warren Buffet, it's better to be generally right than precisely wrong. Hopefully that analysis will appear on this site shortly for your perusal!
I haven't dug into the Libya data yet but I hope to sometime soon.

Good point at the end - it's surely hard to mount an expeditionary force if you can't deliver it where it needs to go!

Enjoy your weekend Paul.

Jordan
 
Paul  Smyth

November 21, 2011

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Jordan,

not a North/South divide?!

Yes, depends how you define 'performance' and bound the 'Balkans' (Cf Bosnia with Kosovo) of course, I guess you mean the earlier conflict....

I once helped with some MoE work in the Pentagon when I was a UKLO. Extremely difficult (the MoE work, not being an LO!). If you would like any comment/diff eyes before going public please feel free to use the e-mail address on my website.

Paul
 
Jordan  Becker

November 22, 2011

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I actually mean both - I would assess that Europeans' overall contribution (political and military) in Libya was more impactful than it was in Kosovo - and Kosovo was certainly an improvement over Bosnia.
Thanks for the offer - I will send you a note.
Jordan
 

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