As opinion polls show that American public support for the mission in Afghanistan falling below 50 percent, clarifying the need for greater engagement is more crucial than ever. General Stanley McCrystal's current plan goes further than any previous request to reflect the real needs of American troops and Afghan security forces. However, it does not go far enough. In light of growing political opposition and the approaching 2010 congressional elections, the full resources needed are being denied, in turn compromising America 's long-term national security interests for short-term political gain. Greater rhetorical and substantive commitment is required by national leaders across the political spectrum.
August 2009 saw the highest number of casualties in a single month in Afghanistan this year. The negative accounts surfacing from the recent presidential election threatens to further widen the credibility gap of the Afghan government and international mission. The anti-war movement, which fiercely opposed US involvement in Iraq and strongly supported Barack Obama's presidential campaign, is now preparing to mount an anti-Afghanistan campaign with equal, if not greater, determination.
General McCrystal's strategic shift does not present anything particularly new. It formalizes what has long been requested and what many knew long ago needed to be done. Many in Washington , however, remain in denial or are deliberately avoiding discussion due to fear of a political backlash. For many legislators, expressing the words "more troops" is tantamount to walking on eggs. But any increase in US and international troop levels must be a transitional prescription. Among the numerous challenges confronting the Afghan government, the lack of sufficient forces seriously impacts its credibility. Ironically, it is quite an achievement that then Afghan National Army (ANA) remains one of the few government institutions with wide public support since 2001. Generally, it is ethnically balanced, disciplined, and usually ahead of schedule in its development. However, there is an enormous disproportion between existing ANA forces and the land that needs to be secured. Despite the presence of additional international forces for recent elections, the number of ANA troops was still not adequate to secure a proper election.
Lack of sufficient troop support on the ground regularly requires airstrikes which often result in civilian casualties. Although such casualties have dropped significantly this year when compared to 2008, a greater number of well-trained Afghan troops holding ground can help reduce such tragic incidents.
In addition, the new army was created with weapons from over 30 years ago. The provision of new arms and sufficient trainers are still lagging. Until recently, the US was providing 4,000 trainers, while other allies struggle to provide 400 trainers. Trainers are a short-term investment that will yield long-term dividends, particularly when considering that the cost of one US soldier is equivalent to 70 Afghan soldiers. Increasing soldiers' salaries will also ensure greater retention. Accelerating the growth of the ANA is crucial to filling the capability gap. The ANA must eventually be able to assume greater responsibilities by leading more missions with NATO support.
Beyond sporadic rhetoric, building up Afghan security forces with the required resources to fight a full-fledged conflict was not a priority for US policymakers until recently. Over the years, constant requests by the ANA for more funds to expand its size and efficiency went largely ignored. Funding by international partners has also been limited. Furthermore, it often takes too long for the international mission to build consensus and then deliver. A significant increase in the NATO trust fund is required. The need is far larger than what has been pledged.
To further complicate m
atters, violence has risen above expectations over the past year. Although Afghan and international forces are inflicting more casualties, the insurgents remain well-equipped, trained, resourced and increasingly sophisticated. The insurgents have a committed sponsorship and more foreign fighters from neighboring states. Sensing that momentum is on its side, the insurgency has expanded its operations to the more stable north, particularly in small enclaves of Pashto communities and disrupting formerly safe supply routes. The insurgency is expecting an eventual foreign withdrawal from Afghanistan. They are preparing for this outcome and are further encouraged by constant talk of an exit strategy. By focusing their efforts on several fronts they aim to weaken the will of the international community.
Dramatically lifting the ceiling on the number of Afghan troops is long overdue. Ultimately, if the international coalition provides greater enablers, the ANA can increase its effectiveness and secure more parts of Afghanistan . An expanded and better-equipped ANA doing more of its own fighting will send a strong message to the insurgency.
In Afghanistan, might is often equated with right. When reaching out to reconciliable segments of the insurgency, the central government must provide substantive carrots and an even more formidable stick.
Marco Vicenzino is president of the Global Strategy Project, world affairs commentator for leading international media outlets and provides mgeo-political risk analysis for multinational corporations around the world. He can be reached at msv@globalsp.org.
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September 29, 2009
Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)
We have missed the right time to pull out of Afghanistan: that process should have started more than a year ago at the latest (as it was intensely discussed in this think tank). Isn't it interesting to compare the argumentation then with the piece of Marco Vicenzino now! In the past it was said, we need to protect the Afghan government from the Taleban, and we cannot have Afghans do the job themselves, because we are afraid that they will start another civil war. But in fact, Afghans were not armed as we didn't trust them. We knew that the majority doesn't like the presence of foreign troops, which illustrate very visibly how decisions regarding the future of the country are not made in Kabul, but in Washington D.C.
So reading between the lines, the article by Marco Vicenzino makes clear that the war in Afghanistan was never about chasing a group of fanatic terrorists, or "peacekeeping", but about occupying a foreign country. We must remember that there were no more than 5,000 US forces in Afghanistan in 2001, but the country was much more stable than it is now. Fortunately, the Afghan fighters are not yet supported by a major foreign power, as were the mudjahedeen by the CIA. But in this context, and remembering NATO's massive military presence, the successes of the 'insurgents' are even more impressive.
There is no need to further discuss the issue from a military point of view. All that could be said is already written down in analyses of the Soviet occupation. There you can also read what is going to happen in the future: the Karzai government and ANA will stay operational as long as they receive western aid. At the point when some future US government loses interest, they will fall and the country will most likely tumble into another civil war. Or another, regional power succeeds in pacifying the country with wiser politics and some military aid, thus 'taking over'.
Although still more of our soldiers will die in vain, and more billions of dollars will be wasted before this military adventure ends, I think now is time for a political analysis and assessment of this gross POLITICAL failure. The US had all trump cards in its hands in 2001. In my opinion, failure started when an alien western 'democratic' system was imposed on the Afghan society. The remaining terrorists were not chased down, probably intentionally, since they were a good reason to station a military force in the area. And when the situation deteriorated, it was decided to send more troops in order to control things militarily. The last, and probably biggest mistake was to put NATO formally in command in order to force the European allies to provide some half-hearted support of the overstretched US military. This not only betrayed the defensive mission of the alliance, but damaged NATO's reputation worldwide and especially in Europe. Due to the European unhappiness with Afghanistan, now a redefinition of the tasks and decision-making within NATO is on the table, which essentially means that the leading role of the US is at stake. Again, trust has been lost - that the US lead NATO was never questioned before, because everyone trusted they would do it well.
Afghanistan is a pile of broken glass. I wonder how stupid the Bush administration was to exactly repeat the Soviet mistakes, even though there was no organization like the CIA luring them into this military adventure. As it seems, we are really living in the "Age of Stupid", as proposed in the film by Franny Armstrong.