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A strategy for improving Russian-Western relations has to take into account the possibility of sudden, unforeseeable change in both Russia and the West. Western policy should therefore insulate itself against political short-term developments while strengthening transatlantic and Russian ability to deal with long-term change. Focusing policy on Moscow's current leadership alone is too risky. Instead, a bottom-up approach is required: The ordinary citizens of Russia should be reached out to in order to have a partner in times of uncertainty.

When we speak about Russia, we usually concentrate on two things. Firstly, the immense size of the country and secondly, the small elite that controls all branches of federal and state government, most of the nationwide media and the economy. In German policy debate, many argue that a country of this size cannot be measured by Western standards of democratic liberties. Hence, all that Germany can do is engage in commerce while condemning only the worst violations of human rights and generally hope for the best.

This kind of policy has resulted in a continuous stream of natural gas to power Germany's growing demand for "clean" energy and an equivalent stream of money from German consumers to the coffers of the Russian elite. To be sure, this new wealth has also benefited the common people but certainly not to a sufficient degree. Paradoxically, freedom in Russia has both increased and declined in recent years. Customers enjoy unequalled freedom of choice, which is quite laudable. On the other hand, political freedoms and the rule of law have increasingly suffered and have been effectively ignored during the last number of years.

The exchange of natural gas for cash cannot be relied on to keep stability and peace between both sides indefinitely. For Russia, an economy based on the exploitation of raw materials and heavy industries is vulnerable to serious shocks from events outside its control - no one can tell whether demand for those products will keep on rising or not. New technologies and ever faster changing consumer patterns may decrease demand for fossil fuels earlier than expected. Technological progress is not dictated by five-year plans but by sudden and seemingly arbitrary change. Right now steady growth in the raw material industries is the key to keep the Russian population in check. For the West, there can be no interest in a large country to the East that it is too dependant on a single source of national income. Once oil and gas lose their current value, Russia's already existing social problems will become more acute and leave much of the country an administrative wasteland. We don't know how this vacuum will be filled, but history suggests that the absence of government will not only affect Russia itself negatively but also its neighbors.

This uncertainty has to be accounted for when we talk about improving Russian-Western relations. Therefore, we should not rely on the ever-continuing rule of Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev and their likeminded successors. We do not know if future American governments will focus on domestic policy instead of shaping global politics. We cannot trust forecasts on Western Europe's energy consumption in 2050. Neither personal harmony between individual political actors nor grand energy schemes are going to improve Russian-Western relations in the long term. They will rather make change all the harder.

So what can Germany do in this situation? While there is nothing wrong in having economic interests (after all, international trade is fundamentally based on mutual consent), Germany has to attach values to its businesses if it wants to have any business at all in Russia in the future. This implies strengthening the belief of 140 million Russian citizens in governmental accountability and the rule of law. Giving hope to millions of people is the best insurance against negative effects of sudden developments in Russia's economical and political power structure. Better to have a fair share of engaged citizens when central power erodes than to face millions with no better hope than the demagogues' lofty and dangerous promises.

But how to instill this kind of hope? The German government has different direct and indirect instruments at hand.

Direct Measures

1. Publicly appreciating those Russians that languish in prison on bogus charges
   
   
2. Meeting with opposition leaders when on state visits
   
   
3. Expanding Russian-language broadcasts by Deutsche Welle to counter the Kremlin's news monopoly - as long as the Russian people can't voice their concerns it will be our duty to hold Russia's leaders publicly accountable for their actions
   
   
4. Offering more technical assistance to the Russian government

Granted, this will not produce rosy images from high-level conferences and state visits. Rather, it will generate heated arguments with the Russian government. As a gesture of its positive intentions, Germany should offer much more technical assistance to the Russian government, be it in areas such as justice reform, public health and environmental protection. Improving public services may strengthen the current leadership's grasp on the country now.

For example, overhauling Russia's broken prison system would benefit Russia's society as a whole. Unfortunately, these modern prisons also hold political prisoners which would provoke criticism by human rights advocates. But do we really want to wait with technical assistance until the day a fully democratic government takes over in the Kremlin? The answer is no: There would be a huge risk that this government would disappoint the electorate's hopes for swift change and end the idea of Russian democracy for good.

Indirect Measures

1. Should be carried out by non-governmental entities
   
   
2. Universities, think-tanks and private clubs should be encouraged to develop stronger ties to the remaining institutions of Russian civil society
   
   
3. Germany should open its borders for young people from Russia to study and work there and encourage its European partners to do the same. A common European visa-policy and science programs assisted by the Commission could be cornerstones of the Union's approach to Russia
   
   
4. Entrepreneurship and innovative thinking have to be supported. Not only would this help to diversify Russia's economy but also allow the West to tap into the vast intellectual potential of Russia

Security Issues

Concerning security issues, surely Russia is no longer to be seen as an enemy. The so-called "New Cold War" hasn't happened. However, we must not accept Russia's claim as being the sole guarantor of security in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Every sovereign country should have the right to decide if and with whom it wants to cooperate in security matters.

Unfortunately, prior German governments dismissed our new allies' fears of economic and military confrontation with Russia as paranoid. Russia's military campaign against Georgia, however recklessly the Georgian government might have acted, shows Moscow's willingness to use force in its neighborhood. Drawing up contingency plans for the Baltic States and the Central and Eastern European states as well as regular maneuvers are the least that can be expected to improve our Eastern allies' (and prospective members') trust in NATO and prepare the alliance for an uncertain future. Threat of actual war may be little. But seeing as we can't measure the impact of such a conflict, Germany's political leadership should commit at least some military resources for credible deterrence.

This approach will surely provoke allegations of a military buildup against the Russian people. To counter this impression, Germany should firmly promote the planned missile-defense as a project for American-European-Russian cooperation. A missile-defense system designed against Russian attacks would be a financial, technical and political nightmare. Instead, a trilateral program would be more effective against "rogue" nuclear powers and make the financial burden easier to bear, compared with an exclusively transatlantic solution.

Additionally, NATO States and Russia should engage further in conventional arms control to build up trust. There must be no ambiguity concerning Western capabilities and purely defensive intentions. However, Russia should not have a vote in European security affairs, at least for now - it will take Europe years to formulate a common policy. Adding Russia's vote now would stretch this process indefinitely.

Summary

Without promoting accountability and the rule of law in Russia, the West cannot expect to engage in commerce with Moscow in the long-term. Western focus should be on the general population, not self-declared elites that may turn out to be false friends. Helping to modernize Russia's public services will be overall beneficial to both Russia and the West. NATO should play a key role in insuring Central and Eastern Europe against future threats. Finally, Germany's position has to be firmly in the West, not somewhere in the middle between Paris and Moscow. Only firm values and beliefs will make Germany's position credible and contribute to better Russian-Western relations.

Philipp Große studies Law in Bonn.

This article is shortlisted for atlantic-community.org's student competition "Ideas with Impact: Policy Workshop 2010" sponsored by the U.S. Mission to Germany.

Read the other shortlisted articles in the category "Russia and the West" here.  

November 10, 2010

Benjamin Hanke, Universität Leipzig, Silver Contributor (37)

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Dear Philipp,

thanks for a view focusing less on the traditional bonding and bartering between grand olde states(wo)men, but rather on trying to initiate change at the base of the political system! It may take a little more than just initiating "hope" in 140 million Russians, but perhaps "ambition" will do. Linking investments, e.g. in shared pipeline systems, directly with requirements for improvements in the rule of law sector, could be a first step securing the position of smaller private enterprises currently threatened by corruption and organized crime. They would be in turn made more attractive for further investments, be able to grow and their owners and employees thus empowered and given incentive to participate in enacting further change. A stronger economic link between the West and the Russian population below the level of (state)oligarchs would prove a base for the branching out of relations into other fields and assure that the developments are geared toward a more democratic direction.

Insofar it is less of a plan to directly help the existing opposition - which, as you noted, would sour relations with the current government, a government still very much in power and thus not to be overly aggravated - but an effort to get a larger part, a critical mass, of the population to support the ideas of that opposition.

However, I disagree with one aspect of your security policy recommendations. You are right in characterizing Russia as "no longer an enemy". That's why, in my opinion, it does not make sense to treat them as a potential partner in a continental missile defense system on one side, and on the other still consider them a potential threat - however remote - to the security of the Baltic and Eastern European states. Deterrence in the form of maneuvers and keeping a large stock of conventional weapons is a thing of the past. The Cold War is over and, as you stressed, a "New Cold War" never happened. I believe that the existing security concerns of those states wedged between Russia and Germany are alleviated much better by

a) fostering a spirit of cooperation in all areas of public policy - including, but not limited to security issues such as disarmament - between all partners, meaning not only Washington, Moscow and the other major NATO states. When the voices of the Eastern European and Baltic states are not heard in questions of European security or energy supply, they will of course be suspicious of the Russian government's motives. An increased participation will lessen these reservations and in turn make possible

b) a comprehensive European security architecture. That could be the ultimate guarantee for a lasting peace in not only all of Europe, but beyond - that is the critical and crisis-ridden regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia. You are right in noting that it's already taking Europe years to formulate a common policy without Russia. I think that's exactly the problem: Russia is not involved as an actor within, able to negotiate and reach compromises, but only as a major topic, which 27 (EU)/28 (NATO) states have different opinions about.

Inclusion is the new deterrence.

Tags: | Russia | Europe | deterrence | rule of law |

November 10, 2010

Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)

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Dear Benjamin,

thank you for your comment!

Indeed, building up credible yet limited conventional capabilities while at the same time inviting Russia to join the missile defence project may sound contradictory.
On the other hand side, both the West and Russia can't afford the strategy of nuclear confrontation anymore. Unfortunately this may increase the risk for small-scale, conventionally fought conflicts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. To be clear, it's an important achievement to have overcome the nuclear stalemate. But it may encourage reckless political and even military actions in the future. Having reliable military resources available is a necessary precaution for this scenario. Even more so if this helps to calm down fears in Eastern Europe and make the moderate voices audible.

We don't need a new arms race. Inclusion should become element of our strategy, pending on the West's progress in finding common ground among its members first. Preparations for rougher times are needed as well and may be implemented sooner.

A different sort of threat may stem from new members in the nuclear club. In this case Russia and the West have mutual interest to deter those countries from using the bomb. New nuclear powers may be less rational than traditional ones and calculate the cost of retaliation differently. With missile defence their arsenals' potential for political extortion would be alleviated. I think this could be a starting-point for Russia's inclusion into European security policy.

Concerning your point a) I agree with you. It's not only the new members of EU and NATO that feel left out sometimes, also other smaller states have to be taken more seriously by the big players.

Regarding b), maybe you will elaborate on this in your paper yet to be published online? I'm sure this topic is central for our whole discussion.

Regards,

Philipp

November 11, 2010

Marcel Lewicki, University of Munich, Silver Contributor (45)

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Dear Philipp,

I agree with your comprehensive summary of the situation we now face. Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is still somewhat considered an "alien entity" in Europe. Its political system, while nominally democratic, is still radically different from Western and other Eastern European countries that have since joined the European Union and NATO. Thus, it is important to promote the rule of law and support the development of democratic accountability. The question is, how do we go about it?

You have proposed a number of interesting options the German goverment has at hand to promote rule of law and democratic accountability in Russia. While I agree to most of them, I do not think that putting pressure on Russia through openly and vocally supporting political prisoners and officially meeting with opposition figures (of which there are not that many around anymore, for obvious reasons) is the right way. Acts like this are in my opinion directed at the population at home than at the host government and will do more harm than good when engaging Russia's elites. The Russian government - and most notably Prime Minister Vladimir Putin - are notoriously allergic to outside criticism, deeeming it a violation of Russian sovereignty. This was most evident in 2008, where - justified - Western criticism of Russia's actions in Georgia was agrily disregarded by Mr Putin.

I agree with your recommendation to expand Russian-language service on Deutsche Welle. Again, though, the question remains how DW will report on Russian politics. Should it be a German Voice of America (considered propaganda even in the US) or should it rather follow the BBC in a more neutral journalistic approach? I do not think that it is DW's duty to hold Russia's leaders accountable for their deeds; it sounds a little patronising to suggest that if Russians cannot do the job themselves, a Western organisation will have to step in. Rather, Germany should focus on supporting and enabling local groups to do so themselves - exactly the job that organisations like KAS and FES do all around the world.

Which brings me to the indirect meassures you propose and to which I agree wholeheartedly. It is of the utmost importance to aid in the development of Russian civil society - it is a lot better, not only for Russian-Western relations but also for discourse within Russia, to have local organisations like newspapers, NGOs or citizens' movements to do advocacy by themselves. This would make sometimes insincere criticism by Western governments at least in part redundant.

As for security issues, you propose that Germany commits at least part of its military to deterrence - deterrece against Russia? While I can understand the rationale behind it, I think it would be rather destructive for Russia's reinvigorated relationship with NATO. After all, how can your outstreched hand be taken seriously if on the one hand you engage in common manoeuvers with the Russian fleet, but on the other hand commit defence resources explicity to the defence against Russia? A course of action like this might credibly reset Western-Russian relations - but not in the way most Western government would want to.
The fear of Russian military intervention is still lingering in some parts of the post-Soviet world - and understandably so. The August War of 2008 has more or less ruined Russia's credibility as a "peacekeeper" in the Caucasus, especially because it supports secessionist regimes in Georgia, but also fights secessionist insurgencies in the North Caucasus. As countries like Azerbaijan, Ukraine and even Belarus are inching closer to Europe, Western countries should help Russia in finding a facesaving solution for the Caucasian quagmire. After the 2008 Bucharest summit, it is clear that Georgia and Ukraine will not be joining NATO any time soon. It is important to point out to Russia that the West does not intend to infringe on what Russia sees as its zone of influence, by, say, stationing troops on former Soviet soil (the Baltics being an exception as NATO members).

If the West can secure Russian cooperation, Russia can be an important partner in solving other pressing problems the West faces in other parts of the world, for instance the crisis surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme. We should promote rule of law and accountability in Russia - but in a way that does not unnecessarily upset the current Russian leadership. Like it or not, we are stuck with Mr Putin for the time being. Change will come slowly in Russia, but it will come eventually. Germany can play an important part in this - within its national limitations.

November 11, 2010

Matthias Conrad, Free University of Berlin, Silver Contributor (59)

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Dear All,
Thank you for the discussion. I would like to add my comments on Philipp’s paper.
Generally speaking, I agree with six out of your eight recommendations for direct and indirect measures to foster cooperation between Russia and the West. However, I have great difficulties with the general direction of your paper. Let me clarify:
I agree fully
a) with your analysis that a significant increase in Russian GDP has led to more private/individual liberty while the level of public/political liberty has declined.
b) with your direct measures 1, 2 and 4 (support political prisoners; meeting opposition leaders on state visits; offering more technical assistance to the Russian government)
c) with your indirect measures 2, 3 and 4 (stronger links between academic institutions, private clubs and the Russian civil society; the need for a common visa-policy and scientific exchange programs; strengthening entrepreneurship and innovative thinking in Russia)
d) with your call for a trilateral missile defense project (if there has to be one, given its costs and my doubts about its technical feasibility) as well as continuing cooperation in conventional arms
e) with your analysis that a “monocultural” structure of the Russian economy, i. e. depending on oil and gas only, is dangerous – for Russia and the West. Thus, a diversification and a modernization of the Russian economy is badly needed and this cannot be stressed enough. But I would argue that this is almost common sense in the political elite and in the Russian population.
f) Pushing for anti-corruption measures and a strengthened rule of law is imperative. You have my full consent on this.
(Un)fortunately, I have trouble conceding to the following arguments:
1) I cannot quite follow your warnings of “the possibility of sudden, unforeseeable change in both Russia and the West”. What do you mean by that? If it is drastic socioeconomic change – I would argue that not even the financial crisis has led to a change in the relationship. I think you aim at technological change with far-reaching consequences. Maybe you could elaborate on that a little more.
2) With regard to your main argument: You call for a policy approach that does not rely on the current leadership but aims at the Russian population. It seems strange to me not to engage with a democratically elected head of state – and somewhat contradictory to you your main argument (Western values as the key). I think we have to work with what we have in Russia. We might not like it – and we should be able to criticize – but we have to work with what we have to create impact.
3) The idea of calling on the Russian population to instill hope for better Russian politicians seems to me out of context. Note that Medvedev and especially Putin enjoy enormous support in the Russian population.
4) On a more general note, I am very skeptical about the possibility to push Western values from the outside in Russia. It is important to consider the experience that Russia has made in the 1990s with Western exports such as a liberal market economy and democracy. Those terms are associated with chaos, anarchy, crime, enormous socio-economic hardships, insecurity etc. > Russia as a state, I would say, was on the verge of collapse in the 1990s. It is important to keep this in mind.
5) If we want to have a self-confident middle class, it is helpful to keep the Western experience in mind. The French Revolution can be perfectly explained by a nascent civil society that called for greater political freedoms in order to ensure on the political level their socio-economic rise.
6) With regard to your recommendations for security issues. “Credible deterrence” is a very dangerous road. You emphasize the “purely defensive intentions”. However, the Cold War has perfectly shown how defensive measures are perceived as offensive efforts – a text book example of a security dilemma.
To sum up, I agree perfectly with 75% of your recommendations. Still, I cannot follow you when it comes to pushing Western values eastward. They are simply too discredited in Russia (for the moment). This is not to say that human rights do not count or that corruption is a good thing. Quite to the contrary. But forcing our own values onto any country in the world – put sharply: an export of our ideological convictions - does not strike me as a good idea. Underpinning this with a logic of deterrence leads down a dangerous path.

November 11, 2010

Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)

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Marcel, thank you for your comment!

I fully agree with you that patronising Russia is not a solution. This is why private engagement (you pointed out some of the suitable outfits) should play a big role in interacting with the Russian civil society. State-sponsored propaganda won't help the cause. I doubt this will be a matter of financial resources. The problem will be rather a lack of political stamina to wait many years before this policy delivers some sort of success.

On security issues I would like to point out that no one can deny Russia a zone of interest - a careful approach to states in Russia's neighborhood will have to weigh the advantages of closer cooperation against the possible disadvantages of Russia's disapproval: If there is no net benefit, closer ties to the state in question are not in our interest. Russia's legitimate reservations must find consideration. We just have to draw a line where interest becomes interference.
Let me stress again, my proposed re-allocation of military resources is strictly a measure of insurance. It will bear a political price, for sure, but considering we can't predict the future, it's a price worth paying for.

Matthias, thank you as well for your thoughts! Regarding your concerns I'd like to point out:

1) It's actually hard to be specific here. That's the very nature of technological change: To a great extent it happens by accident. In my opinion, the monocultural pattern of Russia's economy makes it more vulnerable to negative events and less open to embrace new technologies. Identifying this problem is an important first step. But I doubt the Russian government can deal with this problem in a top-down fashion: This will likely replace technologies from the past with technologies without a future. The bottom-up approach is more promising but depends on entrepreneurial activity, which will only be fruitful in a climate of political liberty and protection by the law.

2), 3), 4) You're right in saying we have to work with what we have, there's no way around it. My point is, we don't know what kind of governments we will face after this one and which direction they will take. As every government, democratic or authoritarian, needs public support, a steady commitment to Russian civil society should prevent the emergence of an openly hostile government (again, it's insurance). If it helps to increase citizens' appetite for democratic accountability and the rule of law, that's all the better.

I don't want to force our values on Russia. Values are more than a formality. If they are artifically transplanted, they are worthless. Russia is a member of the Council of Europe and has ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. This shows already a certain commitment to those fundamental rights I talk about. Our approach should support Russia in actually implementing those rights step-by-step. If in the long-term Russia wants to have a say in European issues, it should adhere to the basic legal principles of Europe. There is another argument for this: Without the rule of law, Russia will attract less foreign investment as it actually needs,and worse, pay a huge premium on the funds it receives.

I concede that talking about "Western values" isn't helpful if people associate chaos and mayhem with it. Maybe there is a better way of naming and communicating it?

5) The emergence of a new middle-class should indeed be helpful for Russia's political modernization. See also my remarks to 1).

6) I think we will have to live with this dilemma and pay the price for it. What we can do is limiting the negative impact, for example by opening missile defence to Russia and keep arms reduction and monitoring a priority.

You're right in saying the export of ideological convictions is dangerous. But I find nothing wrong with stressing the advantages of democracy and the rule of law and offering other countries a path to adopt (and modify) these values. If Russia has to offer a third, better way to its neighbors, it should come forward with it. Competition would benefit us as well, in giving cause to discuss the problems our socities face.

November 12, 2010

Guli Babadjanova, Philipps Universität Marburg, Gold Contributor (80)

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Dear Philipp,

Thank you for your constructive thoughts on how to improve Western-Russian relations.

I agree when you say:
1. “a bottom-up approach” is needed in laying stable ground for cooperation and Russia’s further development;
2. that mutual personal sympathy among Western and Russian political leaders is not a long-term answer for promoting constructive dialogue
3. that a comprehensive approach (demanding participation of the USA-EU-Russia) is required when mobilizing efforts against terrorism, non-proliferation and security issues

However, I tend to see things rather differently regarding some of your points:


Firstly, it seems problematic, trying to build mutual trust and cooperation in the security field, at the same time condemning your “partner” behind his back. I do not think it would make your aim easier, when you support prisoners and visit opposition members, especially on state-visits. As far as I know, official state-visits are payed as a symbolic gesture and sign of friendship, laying base for further cooperation, restoring diplomatic relations, signing of treaties and simply demonstrating good intentions to the host-state. Emphasizing opposing views would set back fostering of mutual partnership.
There are many other ways in expressing negative attitudes in regards to human rights violations, corruption and poor rule of law. For instance, the opposition in exile, media and international conferences could serve this aim.


Secondly, “regular maneuvers” and “contingency plans” to increase trust within the NATO-members in the Baltic, Central and Easteuropean region will not harm the promoting of intra-organization mobilization. However, unilateral (meaning NATO) decisions on missile-defence deployments in the Russian background only harmed its perceptions about transatlantic intentions in the neighborhood. A new European security architecture could serve the uniting role in achieving steps in the security area. Deterrence activities of any state against “sudden change” could only lead to security-dilemma and further stagnate the situation.


Thirdly, energy resources in your view can hardly serve the goal of guaranteeing peace and stability between Russia and the West. “Indefinitely” is certainly not the word in economic or political terms, however, and I believe indeed, that energy can serve a uniting role between these two parties. If you look back at the history of European integration energy was exactly the commodity integrating the european states. In fact, first European integration organizations were EurAtom and European Coal and Steal Organization.


Fourthly and this relates to the point above, in conditions of constant growth in the world population and with it the increase in energy-demand to fuel economic development of states, natural gas and oil are the major covering sources of these needs. I believe, years and even decades are required to achieve energy diversification as it is a rather expensive project which of course worth investing in the long-term. Moreover, bio-energy such as deriving from grain and other food-products is hard to achieve due to the growing global food-scarcity. Therefore, natural gas will continue to fuel economic growth of states as well as their cooperation and integration within certain organizations.

November 12, 2010

Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)

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Dear Guli,

Thank you for your comment! I think we are mostly on the same page with our ideas, especially when it comes to investing into Russia's civil society. The differences you point out may not so huge at all.

Firstly, I think resilient relations between states (and I think Germany and Russia have strong enough ties) allow for a certain amount of public criticism. Friends, or at least partners, need each other's opinion. Pushing for harmony at any rate doesn't solve conflicts. Too be sure, it's not easy to balance these two concepts but I think Russia and the West are grown-up powers that can handle even the more inconvenient truths.

Secondly, you're right in calling the original missile-defense concept a mistake in regards to Moscow's reaction. That's why I support opening the project to Russia as well. Still, when it comes to air-defense (or any other long-distance weapons systems) we can't avoid covering zones of Russian interest as well, if we don't want to demilitarize Central and Eastern Europe completely. But that's not wrong in my opinion - after all, we don't demand Russia to retreat its defense capabilities far behind its own borders in order to avoid overlapping coverage with our zones of interest. The key to managing this dilemma is arms limitations, observer missions and, to maybe give an example for actual cooperation, integration in policing of airspace, involving Russia, the West and willing states in between. If Russia and the West are both well aware of each others capabilities, procedures and intentions we can limit the effects of this dilemma.

Abandoning NATO's defense capabilities in Eastern Europe at all is not an option. In my opinion we should equip future governments with all the civil and most of the military instruments we can think of to deal with unforeseeable events. Making the decision, which instrument to use in which case is up to our elected governments.

Thirdly, energy will indeed play a big role in Western-Russian relations, whether our demand for Russian gas grows further or evaporates earlier than expected. I don't know whether we can compare the current situation to the beginning of the European Communities - cooperation in the fields of coal and steel was initially designed to prevent Germany from re-arming and nuclear power was going into civil application. As recent history shows, the supply network for natural gas itself can be used as a political weapon. Therefore any comprehensive agreement will have to limit governments' grasp on the controls, a hard sell to some governments. Nevertheless, cooperation in energy matters is important in many respects (as Matthias's paper convincigly shows) and deserves further discussion. The question is, whether Russia and the West can agree on common policy goals: As long as Russia's economy relies on cheap fuels there is hardly an incentive for energy conservation and moderation of emissions. On the other hand side, foreign investment into modern technologies and production methods in Russia will depend on improving good governance and giving independence to the judiciary.

November 15, 2010

Alexandra Vasileva, Freie Universität Berlin, Silver Contributor (73)

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Dear Philipp,

Let me comment on your article which contains many interesting and reasonable ideas.

I am very much in fond of your bottom-up approach and the promotion of the civil society dialogue. This is definitely something that is beneficial for every society and for understanding between people. However, as I write in my response to your second comment to my article, due to Russian understanding of sovereignty, the direct Western support of Russian oppositional forces of broadcasters critical of Kremlin is very likely to be perceived as intrusive. In your article you admit that your direct measures 1-3 may not produce “rosy images” on the high-level politics – and this is exactly the crux of the problem. The civil society support should not be undertaken on the highest political level, in my opinion. Rather, as you also suggest under “indirect measures”, it should happen on the civil society level (NGOs, universities, think tanks). The facilitation of visa regime would certainly make a positive contribution, too – I subscribe to this idea in my article, too. So I very much agree with your “indirect measures” and do not see any reason not to call these measures DIRECT.

Coming back to measures not producing “rosy images”: I wonder if technical assistance is an innovative solution. First, large technical assistance to Russia belongs largely to the past – to the 1990s, or the transition period (especially EU’s TACIS, but also USAID programmes and Western consultancy, of course). From the developmental point of view, Russia has already reached a per capita income and a level of economic and human development which is above the development aid/technical assistance threshold – largely due to the vast oil and gas revenues.
We all know that despite that in many societal areas (undiversified economy, corrupt public administration, social inequality, inadequate welfare, health and provision of basic services) Russia still needs help. But – and now I come to my second point – Russia does not ask for help anymore, partly because it does not want to be further treated as junior partner and rather tries to promote the image of the resurrecting great power (see also Guli’s article). So the problem with your “offering more technical assistance” advice may be precisely the “offering” part: the West may offer more assistance – but Russia seems unlikely to embrace it.
I think other ways have to be found (probably again via rhetorical reframing!) to engage Russia in cooperation with the West in the areas of justice reform, public administration, housing, energy efficiency and so on (all indeed pressing problems in Russia and at the same times areas where the West can offer enough expertise). In other words, on the political level Russia has to be given a feeling that the West can offer knowledge-and-expertise-sharing on equal terms, or to support modernisation endeavours which Russia ITSELF embarks upon.

So, to sum up the point I make: technical assistance is in substance a good idea, but it has to be offered in a different form, for example via joint cooperation under Russia’s lead. The challenge for the West is to create incentives (free trade zone?).

Coming to the second part of your article – security. There are both points that I agree and disagree with. Generally, I fully support your idea that the West should engage with Russia in the area of security – the promotion of the trilateral cooperation would be indeed very useful in order not to create new dividing lines reminiscent of the Cold War. However, your suggestion about building up a credible Western deterrence potential contradicts to your first idea and sounds to me quite like the Cold War in fact!
Surely, peaceful mechanisms have to be found in order to prevent conflicts in the common neighbourhood such as the 2008 South Ossetia war (I propose the UN conflict prevention and solution mechanism, which Germany could push for in 2011 due to its Security Council seat). But the building up of the military deterrence potential would be absolutely counterproductive in terms of the improvement of relations with Russia. We should also keep in mind how high the Western collective defence spending already is. Rather, the West should agree on a common strategy (something the EU has difficulties with) and further engage Russia in mutual demilitarisation and arms control, as you suggest. This is what I can fully subscribe to. So my suggestion would be to adhere to your security recommendations leaving out the deterrence component.

I am looking forward to your opinion and hope that this comment can contribute to our mutual generation of further innovative ideas!

November 15, 2010

Marcel Lewicki, University of Munich, Silver Contributor (45)

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Hi Philipp,

thank you for your quick answer and sorry for my late reply. I just got back to Germany on the weekend. I agree that political stamina is needed to accomplish long-term change in Russia by the "soft" means we discussed earlier. In the end though, I believe that a "Wandel durch Annäherung" policy towards Russia is more beneficial than an aggressive heads-on approach - especially for Germany.

As for your ideas on security policy, I still have a couple of questions. Firstly, I am not entirely sure what you mean by "re-allocation" of military resources. It's a very wide field, from mere co-operation in the training of Eastern European militaries to German naval patrols in the Baltic sea and common exercises with the Baltic countries' armies.

I agree that Western Europe cannot deny Russia its zone of interest in its "blizhneye zarubezhye" and I also agree that we have to draw a line between "interest" and "interference" - and operations in Georgia in 2008 and Russia's continued support for the break-away republics can very well be classified as interference. The question is, what to do about it?
I do not think that Germany, for one, and Europe in general has the military muscle to flex to impress Russia. Rather, it would have to rely on the United States - as it has throughout the Cold War - to provide the credible deterrence you promote. Germany has been more of an economic than a military-political power in Europe throughout the Cold War and even after its first reluctant "out of area" operations in Bosnia up until now. Germans, be they politicians or "mere" voters, are deeply suspicious of military solutions - and indeed the use of the military as a show of strength. Rather, as an export country dependent on Russian gas, Germany has more levers to pull in the economic sector, as others have already pointed out.

Politically, Germany must toe a very thin red line between engaging Russia and respecting its zone of interest and in promoting democracy in Eastern Europe and supporting its Eastern European partners. I doubt that Russia with its still sizable and, in part, battle-hardened military will be impressed by a European show of force, especially now that for the first time it has joined in common exercises with NATO countries. The EU, and Germany in particular, will have to find other ways to make clear to Russia that it cannot cross the line again like it did in Georgia. An endorsement of Nabucco and other, alternative (i.e. non-Russian) routes for Caucasian and trans-Caspian oil and gas would be a first step.

I think in the end Russia also learned from Georgia, and it will not do something like that again in the near future, doomsday predictions from Georgian politicians notwithstanding. The discourse in Georgia is so focused on the Russian threat and Saakashvili's rhetoric of Russia as "the enemy" is hardly conducive to peaceful negotiations between the two countries.

Thus, Europe has to make it clear that while it respects Russia's zone of interests it also has a stake especially in Eastern European countries as well as the Black Sea litoral - a part of the world, while being Russia's "backyard", is also the EU's neighbourhood: a very literal Common Space.

November 30, 2010

Ingo Mannteufel, Deutsche Welle, Silver Contributor (33)

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Hi!

First of all, as head of Deutsche Welle Russian I really appreciate the support by Philipp and others. But I would like to add that we neither are a "German propaganda service" nor that we are a German tool "to hold Russia's leaders publicly accountable for their actions". We are not prosecuters but journalists. It goes without saying, that we are firm believers in democratic values, but we are not lecturing our Russian audience.

We are an independent source of information for relevant news and background information on Germany, Europe and Russia. For our Russian audience we have news reports, analysis and commentaries on and from Germany and Europe. In addition to that we feature events in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia and in the Caucasus from a German or European point of view. That’s why we have interviews with all different kinds of experts and politicians, including Russian opposition politicians and experts, who are less visible on Russian state media. In short: We are following the tradition of good journalism so that our Russian audience can make well-based judgements on relevant topics.

December 6, 2010

Philipp Johannes Große, Koblenz University of Applied Sciences, Silver Contributor (58)

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Dear Mr. Mannteufel,

thank you for your comment. Sorry my answer took a while!

I think we, the authors of the memo, agree with Deutsche Welle's general role: Providing independent information and analysis to your respective audiences all around the world, not being the speaker of the German government. This is key to your reputation and the reason why people chose Deutsche Welle as a source of information. "Lecturing" audiences about the merits of democracy and the rule of law is not your business, I agree with you as well.

Still, being independent from domestic political pressure while receiving state-funding puts Deutsche Welle in an unique position: You have the reputation and resources to make a difference. You can afford to make stand against oppressive policies (and for that matter, mistakes in German foreign policy as well), precisely because people trust your judgement in chosing the facts to be presented.

Most commercial or privately-funded broadcasters either lack ambition or resources to take sides once in a while and deal with the consequences. As the mission statement on your homepage says - "We communicate the values of democracy and support human rights". There is a difference between believing in values and communicating them. We wouldn't need Deutsche Welle if you weren't communicating those very values. How you balance facts with opinions is subject to your discretion and journalistic standards. I understand it is tough to manage the confronting expectations you're facing from the public. Still, Deutsche Welle could play an even more important role in influencing Western-Russian relations.

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