Not surprisingly, the
remarkable speech of the Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski in Berlin in
November 2011 has drawn considerable attention not only from the domestic but
also the international public. The most controversial part of his speech
referred to the point that Poland is not only determined to support a federal
Europe but also German leadership of it. "I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity and
strengthening of EU institutions as a threat for Polish sovereignty," Sikorski said.
The Polish main opposition party, Law and Justice (PiS), accused its
political rival of acting against Polish national interests. According to the
PiS leaders, Sikorski advocated "Fourth Reich and German hegemony" (J. Brudzinski),
and supported a model of the European Union that would make the Polish
people live like Indians in a highly protected reserve (A. Hofman).
By
contrast, international comments on the Sikorski speech in Berlin were focused mostly
on the new quality of the Polish-German relationship. Because of the
geopolitical position of Poland squeezed between two regional powers as well as
the dark history of Polish-German relations, many observers seemed to be astonished
by Warsaw's support for its powerful Western neighbor interpreting it as a newly
emerged trust for the country that invaded Poland in 1939.
However, both domestic and international comments miss the essence of Sikorski's
message, as it seems that neither did he show trust for the Germans nor did his
ideas expose Poland to a greater threat. Rather, Sikorski based his vision of
saving the European project on a careful calculation of costs and benefits for
Polish security from supporting German leadership.
The conclusion can be that as maintaining the EU largely depends on a German lead, strengthening Berlin's position in the EU would be less dangerous than dissolving the eurozone, and then, not unlikely, the whole European framework. In fact, history teaches that a disordered Europe consisting of loosely tied nation-states can end tragically for Poland. Today, Polish consternation about the dissolution of European structures is additionally enhanced by another aspect: The rising power of its Western neighbor.
The fact that German foreign policy since unification has changed, becoming more assertive, is without question. But if Germany fell out of love with Europe, was going to deepen the re-emerged economic nationalism, and finally departed the eurozone, the EU as a political and security project would stagnate, erode and eventually cease to exist.
Now, what can Poland do in terms of maintaining its security when facing
the increasing power of its Western neighbor as well as the worrying state of
European integration? Let's agree on two statements:First, saving the eurozone
requires considerable support from Berlin. Second, the times when Germany
supported European integration without openly expecting more control and
influence over EU rules and politics in return are over. In this situation, the
current Polish political establishment points out two different key threats to
Polish security: For the main opposition party the primary threat is clearly
rising German influence in the EU. By contrast, the current government appears
more worried about dissolving European structures than Berlin's increased
control of them. There is agreement that as long as Berlin's intentions are
not perceived as threatening Polish security, any collapse of the EU can be
prevented under one crucial condition: The acceptance of Germany as a
hegemonial power by its European partners.
In summary, in confronting the eurozone crisis, Poland finds itself in a
geopolitically difficult situation. The current Polish government appears to
believe that supporting Germany in getting more control over the EU may keep
the rising power of its neighbor at bay. But if some political realists are
right, power can be constrained only by power. If Germany, accompanied by the
acceptance and even encouragement of other European states, will continue its
path of gaining a position of regional hegemon, the crucial question of who
will be able to balance it in the future should be asked already today. The question
remains, whether blocking Germany from getting a hegemonial status and, therefore,
contributing to a loosening and weakening of European integration, would be a
safer option for Poland.
Dr. Daria W. Dylla is a senior researcher and a teacher at the Institute
for International Politics and Foreign Policy at the University of
Cologne. She specializes in the European Foreign and Security Policy,
transatlantic relations, and theories of International Relations.
- 7
January 9, 2012
Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)
If Germany is at the moment perceived as capable of dominating Europe as hegemon, that is not because the Germans strived to become more powerful, but simply because they were not so strongly affected by the financial crisis. If other European countries had managed their economy more carefully, the whole union would be in a better state.
In fact, its current strong position is as much a problem for Germany as for its neighbours. The German options seem to be, sacrifice your own well-being and strong economy for saving Greece and Italy from bankruptcy (with long-term inflation and declining wealth for everybody ahead), or force everyone to act economically in a more sustainable way (with short-term strongly declining wealth of bankrupt countries and political fears of a 4th Reich ahead). None of these options is very attractive.
If we keept our minds clear, we must say that even the German way of managing the economy can strongly be improved, and we may agree that more sustainable ways of economic action would be wise for Europe as a whole. In this context, the feared 'German domination' of Europe might in fact materialise merely as paradigm shift towards a mentality that is closer to the German model. Which is not to say that it is generally superior (and might in fact be sometimes quite over-cautious or close-minded), but at least less prone to debt crises.
Again, I think the problem is not German strength, but the weakness of some other countries. The future world players are not so much Germany or Russia or even the United States, but larger entities like the European Union and it is certain that Europeans must work together if they want to retain influence on a global scale. In this context, it is very encouraging that the Polish government is not thinking in the mental frontlines of the past, but open for the European Union. In fact, I have the impression that the 'mental economic models' of Germany and Poland are very similar, which might explain Poland's rapid economic growth in the past, and should make an exchange of ideas easy since they are 'transmitted on the same wavelenght'.
The cooperation of Poland and Germany is very important since it could help alleviate fears of domination in the context of the current crisis. Only if the common European idea is strengthened further, it will be possible for all members to take fair reponsibilities for the well-being of the whole union.