Osama bin Laden declared that credit for the collapse of the Soviet Union goes to God – and the mujahideen in Afghanistan. NATO's military engagement in Afghanistan is thus welcomed by al-Qaeda and is seen as an opportunity to destabilize Muslim countries that are allied with the West. Recent developments indicate that things are moving in accordance with al-Qaeda's hopes, and with alarming parallels to the Soviet disaster.
Moscow was initially reluctant to move into Afghanistan until the situation seemed to get out of control. However, the presence of Soviet troops did not have the desired effect of pacifying the country. On the contrary, it caused the rebellion to spread even more.
As NATO today, the Soviets occupied the cities and main axes of communication. Periodically, the Soviet army undertook offensives into mujahideen-controlled areas and relieved government outposts that were constantly under siege. But as NATO today, the Soviets were never able to defeat their enemy decisively. The mujahideen simply dispersed, mixing with villagers or escaping to Pakistan, and continued their ambushes and sabotage missions elsewhere.
The Soviets had hoped to control the situation quickly and firmly by using a large invasion force. Yet the fighting became only more brutal. For example, the Soviets and their Afghan allies reduced the rebellious city of Kandahar to rubble, leaving only one-tenth of its pre-war population. Nevertheless, government control did not improve.
The first reason for the Soviet failure was the military occupation: mission impossible. Secondly, Islam, the center of Afghan culture, was pushed aside. Importing Soviet patterns of life and, thus, destroying shared Afghan identity by placing emphasis on a so-called Afghan nationality was a disastrous tactic.
The US policies in Afghanistan repeat Soviet mistakes and harvest similar disastrous consequences. As Pakistan is increasingly destabilized, the risk of a regional escalation rises, while additional western troop deployments to Afghanistan will fuel the resistance.
But leaving is as dangerous as staying. In the Soviet example, the first step of their exit strategy was transferring the burden of fighting to the Afghan forces. The Afghan army was built up to an official strength of 302,000 in 1986. However, these were theoretical figures. In reality the army suffered 32,000 desertions per year.
Nevertheless, the Najibullah government was able to remain in power until 1992. Under his leadership, the Afghan army achieved an unprecedented level of performance. Najibullah also tried to re-unite the country politically. However, this policy neither made the Moscow-backed Kabul regime more popular, nor did it convince the insurgents to negotiate. In the end, Russia's refusal to sell oil products to Afghanistan in 1992 led to the defection of several tribal warlords, which terminated Najibullah's control of the state.
Ruling Afghanistan is a matter of tribal affairs. This also explains the quick success of the US campaign in 2001: a tribal alliance won the fight on the ground, and most tribal leaders switched their loyalty after the fall of Kabul. The current development in Afghanistan is not the result of missing military strength, but of failure to win continued support of the tribes.
When the western powers neglected Afghanistan after 2001, the Taliban were able to re-group. The legitimacy of the elected Afghan government was severely damaged in 2002 when the US refused to accept restrictions on its military operations. Like the Soviet-backed Karmal regime, the corrupt Karzai government is not respected. Operation "Enduring Freedom" undermined Karzai's credibility and is part of the problem in Afghanistan.
The government must find the support of the Afghan tribes. Afghans can, and must, provide security and development themselves. Western powers should mainly mediate and train Afghan tribes to fight the Taliban. Intensifying the occupation means disaster. Negotiations involving regional powers and supporters of the Taliban are the only policy that can succeed.
Dr. Bernhard Lucke is a researcher dealing with environmental and resource management at the Brandenburgische Technische Universität in Cottbus, Germany.
Editor's Note:
The Financial Times wrote yesterday that NATO forces will implement a new strategy called the "integrated approach" in an effort to woo Afghan tribal power brokers
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- David Neil Lebhar: Afghan Police and Economy: Lynchpins for Success
- Andrew Hammel: What if President Obama Asks for German Combat Troops?
- Abbas Daiyar: Negotiating with Taliban is Admitting Defeat
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November 25, 2008
Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)
First, by pointing to the Soviet experience, he reminds us, that the Afghan conflict didn't start in 2001 or 1996 - it should be obvious, it is not. Western forces 'inherited' a 30-year-old highly dynamic conflict with shifting alliances. The themes of religion and identity, as opposed to Western concepts of good governance and economic welfare, have played a major role throughout these last 30 years. Although Westerners tend to think of themselves as the antipode of the Soviet occupation, this view is not shared by many, many Afghans (interestingy former Mujahiddin and supporters of the communist government alike) who see us as two sides of the same coin: starting from a basically materialistic world-view and relying on advanced technology, we both offer the hope for a better future in exchange for some of the old traditions. Progress, Development, Education, Equality for Men and Women, Obedience to the central government in Kabul were slogans of the Communists in the late 70s and 80s and are now used by us as well - perhaps unknowingly. Far too often, we now assume a position towards the Soviets, that bears a striking resemblance to what Aleksandr Lebed once ironically told a british journalist when asked, why the Soviets didn't learn from the previous british failures: "You were capitalist, imperialist exploiters. We were bringing liberation to the people of Afghanistan. How could we possibly learn anything from you?"
Second, the Soviet example is a wonderful exmaple of good intentions going wrong. As Mr. Lucke outlined, the Soviet strategy called for limited measures: by forcefully replacing 'extremist' president Amin with moderate Karmal and relieving the Afghan army from it's garrison duties, they should in theory be enabled to defeat the 'bandits' on their own. Of cause the very presence of the 'occupyers' fueled the insurgency and thus achieved the opposite effect.
However, I take issue with some of his other remarks and conclusions.
First, while the Soviets sent enough troops to Afghanistan in order to seriously fuel an existing insurgency, they never committed enough troops to actually fight this insurgency. Of cause NATO member states are more than reluctant to send only an equally large number of troops than the 100.000 + Soviet conscripts. But then again, the mere number of troops is not important - strategy, tactics, efficiency, even healthcare (a significant number of the soviet soldiers serving in Afghanistan was consistently unfit for service due to health reasons) and - sometimes, though I hate to admit it - technology count more.
Additionally, the Soviet failure in Afghanistan was a relative one: not able to defeat the Mujahiddin but on the other hand not defeated by them, Gorbachov's decision to 'bring the troops home' was a decision based on weighing political costs and benefits under altered priorities - not a military defat. Research such as Antonio Giustozzi's War Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992 suggests, that the Communists had made tremendous progress towards cementing their rule, when the Soviet retreat in 1989 altered all circumstances.
The survival of Najib's regime for more than three years can be directly tied to the enormous amount of outside help - and so can his downfall in 1992 be tied to the collapse of the USSR and the lack of interest from the new Russian governement. Despite being installed by a foreign power Najib's downfall was far from inevitable. So why we can and should earn from the Soviet experience, the lessons should focus on how to improve our strategy as well as our military operations. While the Soviets failed, this does not mean that we automatically have to fail as well - although it should be a warning.
My second ciritizism is related to the role of the tribes: even when one replaces the word tribe (fitting especially for rural Pashtuns, but not for Dostum whom Mr. Lucke cites and not the so-called Northern Alliance, made up to a large degree of Tajiks who have no tribe-system) with the more general qawm (see the excellent discussion at http://afghanistanica.wordpress.com/2007/05/06/afghanistan-and-the-...); the problem remains, that the traditional structures of society have been shattered or eroded in large parts of Afghanistan during the last 30 years of war. Barnett Rubin's classical "Fragmentation of Afghanistan" is still true for the very 'fragmentation' that results in regions, valleys, even neighbouring villages with a complete different kind of authority. There is not only a significant, but fixed number of tribes: commanders and leaders of all types rival with one another while trying to get support from the central government and sometimes the Insurgents at the same time. After their success with tribal militias in the iraqi province al-Anbar, some US-thinkers have suggested to implement this approach in Afghanistan. There has been some excellent discussion (and overwhelming refusal in the Afghanistan-related Blogosphere, see http://easterncampaign.wordpress.com/2008/11/03/the-death-of-the-an... and http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2008/9/8/insurgency-and-counterin...). Yes, we must do our uttermost to understand the local dynamics of this conflict, but it's not the tribes or any other kind of traditional authority that lies at the heart of this struggle.
As it seems, Mr. Lucke and me agree both on that a half-hearted occupation is a very bad idea. However, while Mr. Lucke is convinced, that military occupations in general do not offer hope for success and thus recommends a withdrawal, I do see hope in an improved strategy and and improved performance of our forces. The ultimate success of our mission - I guess we agree on this point once again - might be rather modest compared to our stated goals and will depend on political processes. However, in my view, the military can help to create favourable conditions for such political processes.