Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

April 2, 2009 |  8 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

How to Extend NATO's MAP to Ukraine and Georgia

Fabian Martin Lieschke: US leadership can respond to the more imminent challenge of Iranian nuclear ambitions and extend NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Ukraine and Georgia. Here is a recommendation to President Obama.


Extending MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia is a very important step towards the creation of a stable and peaceful Europe. Ukraine and Georgia should not function as buffer states or bargaining chips for better relations with an aggressive Russia. According to the Helsinki Final Act, sovereign states are free to choose their alliances. Admittedly, the Euro-atlantic community faces challenges which are more imminent than trying to guarantee stability for the wider Black Sea region. The example of Iran’s nuclear ambitions deserves concentrated attention. Brussels and Washington could need the help of Moscow to deal with the issue.

Yet the urgency to deal with Iran and the benefits to be secured from Russian cooperation should not disrupt the West’s moral compass. US leadership can combine the challenge of Iranian nuclear ambitions with extending MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia. President Obama, this is what you should do on your visit to Europe this week:

  1. Consult with your NATO allies, and deliver a public speech in the Czech Republic after NATO’s summit. In that speech you should emphasize NATO’s Open Door Policy and define MAPs as an open-ended process. A MAP does not translate to automatic membership.
  2. Meet with President Medvedev and make public that you will propose a Biden-Putin Commission, which is to meet at least twice a year to work on issues of common interest. Secondly, you should be prepared to offer Russia the compromise that the US missile defense system will be abolished in the event of a successful diplomatic solution with Iran.

A brief evaluation of this policy recommendation reveals its numerous advantages.

  1. It would mean that President Obama would address multiple audiences. Germany and France would be convinced about the commitments of the US administration to listen to Russian concerns. With better relations to Russia and knowing that a MAP is not a slippery slope to membership, they could be more inclined to extend MAPs to Ukraine and Georgia. In addition, Europeans welcome President Obama’s commitment to diplomacy toward Iran.
  2. In the same way, this policy would address the concerns of Central and Eastern Europeans about being used to secure better relations with Russia. Emphasizing NATO’s Open Door Policy in Prague would act as a signal to Poland and the Czech Republic that the United States is committed to the principle of an undivided, stable and peaceful Europe — with or without missile defense.
  3. A potential offer from the US to end the missile defense problem would put the ball in the Russian's court. Both missile defense and an Iranian nuclear weapons program contradict Moscow’s interests. Pressure abroad would increase since Moscow has no excuse for inaction and could not refer to American unilateralism.
  4. Tehran would have to recalculate the costs of developing a nuclear weapon. It would be the first time that Iran would be standing alone in the face of a united international community. The Iranian leadership would have every reason to be concerned about the prospect of increased pressure from Beijing, eager not to be isolated as an “irresponsible stakeholder” in the international community.

The Obama administration faces a great number of foreign policy challenges. President Eisenhower once said: “If a problem cannot be solved, enlarge it.” Linking the issues of MAPs to the Iranian challenge can address the concerns of the key players, whose cooperation is essential to coming up with solutions for both challenges.

Fabian Martin Lieschke is a student at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

Related materials from the Atlantic Community:

 

 

  • 21
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
Tags: | Obama | Iran | NATO | MAPs | nuclear development |
 
Comments
Simona  Lipstaite

April 5, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
I completely agree with the central premise of the article. It is indeed imperative to extend the MAP to Ukraine and Georgia as soon as possible, especially bearing in mind that this should not have been such a politicised and contentious issue in the first place. Extending MAPs does not mean automatic accession, but rather, the preliminary step before a long road of negotiation and adjustment.

However, the reality, unfortunately, is that Russia somehow seems to have a disproportionately large say in the matter, de facto in the internal NATO affairs, through the objections of countries such as Germany and France. As Fabian said, "sovereign states are free to choose their alliances," however, in this case, seemingly only if it does not raise too many concerns in Russia...

If doing a package deal with Russia regarding Iran and a potential Biden-Putin Commission is what it takes to extend the MAP to Ukraine and Georgia, perhaps Obama could have tried the idea. However, for how much longer are NATO and its decision-making processes prepared to be massaged by Russian objections into a compromise which does not really please anyone?
 
Unregistered User

April 8, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Same old thinking, gentlemen. Russia can be a very important partner. The way you think will make it impossible.

Pressure has never worked and will never work in dealing with the Russians. Europe should integrate Russia together with the rest of the neighborhood.
 
Andrey  Chubyk

April 8, 2009

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Mr. Fabian Martin Lieschke,

you are very optimistic in your estimations. Now we see very clear, that the situation is changing in another direction.
Only several months went out after Russian-Georgian conflict and everyone has forgotten this case - renewing relations in the Russia-NATO-Counsil, close partnership with EU and so on. This clearly means, no possibility for offering something like MAPs to both mentioned countries. Otherwise it will bring new obstacles for cooperation not only between USA and Russia, but also between Russia and mentioned countries, which already wish to be on appropriate level, as it is accepted between neighbours.
First, EU and UAS have to define main strategies of NATO, rules for cooperation with Eastern Partners and then gradually update relations with Ukraine, Georgia and so on.
And Ukraine has to meet more transparency to this point of time in the future.
 
Fabian Martin Lieschke

April 9, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Thanks for your comments!

Simona, your question is interesting: "For how much longer are NATO and its decision-making processes prepared to be massaged by Russian objections into a compromise which does not really please anyone?" I don't think anybody knows the answer to this question. I believe that US decision-makers will silently drop the enlargement issue during Obama's first term. Russia's cooperation is indeed more important in the short-term. But I am certain that Western enlargement (not necessarily NATO, it could also be EU enlargement) will resurface at some point during his second term (or somebody else's presidency if Obama were not to be re-elected).

Dick, what do you mean by "Europe should integrate Russia together with the rest of the neighborhood?" That seems rather vague to me. Perhaps you could clarify what you had in mind.

Andrey, you seem to argue that NATO should not extend MAP to Ukraine and Georgia because Russia invaded Georgia proper in 2008. My point is that NATO should not reward Russia's bullying tactics by suspending NATO enlargement altogether. I do not suggest enlargement in the near future. Both Ukraine and Georgia are far from fulfilling NATO-standards today and may never be able to qualify for NATO-membership. What I am suggesting, though, is that NATO should sustain enlargement by maintaining an open door to countries interested in joining. MAP should hold applicants' feet to the fire. And at the end of the day, NATO will make a strategic assessment whether or not - in this case Ukraine or Georgia - could improve the security by joining the alliance.

I agree with you that NATO needs to clarify its purpose. There are a number of important questions the allies must answer. I do not want to go into detail here (one could write books about the question of NATO's purpose today), but suffice it to say that future enlargement depends on how you would answer this question.
Tags: | NATO |
 
Colette Grace Mazzucelli

April 11, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Thank you for your comments, Fabian. I believe that the steps taken by the Obama Administration, namely, opening negotiations with Russia to reduce nuclear stockpiles and starting direct talks with Iranian counterparts are essential at this time.

My sense is that the agenda for talks with Russia should be tight and focused, i.e., do not bring in missile defense, concentrate on the reduction of arms, to achieve agreement on a treaty by the year's end, which can be ratified in each country. On the other hand, talks with the Iranians should be comprehensive, not focused on the nuclear issue, which is bound to lead to a bilateral standoff and poison multilateral nuclear diplomacy in the Security Council.

I agree that the achievements in the area of nuclear arms reduction with Russia would place the ball in Iran's court, especially if the US can obtain a united front in the P5 + 1 on nuclear diplomacy with Iran. This means bringing and keeping the Russians on board so that the Chinese will take the cue from Russia and support would coalesce in the Security Council around the common interest that proliferation in the Middle East is to no state's advantage, including the Islamic Republic.

With France's re-integration into the integrated military command structure of NATO, the new strategic concept may well be strengthened by efforts to increase the European profile on the civilian side in Afghanistan. The difficulty, as you well know, is less about enlargement and more about purpose. Frankly, one could argue that NATO should let Russia in because the main objective of the Alliance in the medium term is to keep the US involved in Europe in those areas where instability is still a concern in this decade, i.e. Romania-Moldova, as it was in the 1990s, i.e. Hungary-Romania discord.

Both NATO enlargement and missile defense are provocations, and, while Russia does not have a veto, why provoke when the common interest on issue areas like Iran and Afghanistan are addressed more constructively if cooperation with Russia is possible to obtain. If conflict is inherent in the bilateral relationship, cooperation can be facilitated by sophisticated diplomacy that takes into account traditional Russian behavior in its self-defined sphere of influence.

My sense, like yours, is that membership for Georgia and Ukraine is premature. For the latter country, European Union membership would be a more realistic initial goal of its elites who must educate the population about the responsibilities EU membership requires. Maintaining an open door to NATO accession for these countries must not be misinterpreted in either country or in the media as being anything more than what it is: a very long term prospect.

My recommendations for US policy would be:

focus on strict arms reduction to set relations with Russia on firm terrain and build from there across policy areas of common interest;
engage the Iranians directly with a comprehensive Middle Eastern regional strategy in mind in which Iran and Syria have vested interests to be constructive;
recognize that NATO was not originally designed, nor can the Alliance necessarily adapt, to engage in the state-building presently necessary in Afghanistan, which impacts on the transatlantic efforts attempted there;
develop a stronger ESDP profile in NATO bringing Turkey on board even though its EU membership is still being negotiated; and
keep the pressure on for even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals in the years ahead.

The language of global zero is not naive. It is realistic in the face of the tremendous domestic (read Congressional) opposition to reductions and cuts in spending on programs like missile defense in a time of economic and financial crisis. Witness the battle on the Hill that is likely to arise over Secretary Gates' budgetary proposal for the Pentagon.

The 21st century world can do without thousands of nuclear weapons. It is up to Russia and the United States to demonstrate by example that this century marks the end of the cold war, not the end of history. Greetings from New York, Colette (Georgetown '96)
 
Unregistered User

April 12, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
The issue about enlarging NATO's map to include Ukrain and Georgia is perhaps the most pressing issue in the politics of Caucasus and Central Asia. However, the ist question to ask is whether or not the issue carries logic? how does the United States and Europe address Russian's possibility of cooperation at least in eastern Europe? How can Obama and Europe minimize Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iranian Islamic Regime? What forms of foreign policy can the United States employ to bring Russia into cooperative regime especially when the issue is not only economics but also its political influence in its former backyard republics. Aprt from this can the United States be able to give priority to the issue of NATO's expansion considering the financial crisis it has to solve first before endulging into another old but unresolved same issue.

Purely the expansion of NATO to eastern Europe is not about security as defined within the traditional notion of security but rather the influence that the US and Europe would like to have over the newly yet weak states in the region. Russia in the other hand needs economic package to sustain its weaken economy. It is also necessary to understand the need for an institutional reforms within country to eliminate corruption and unemployment. The US and Europe should show good well to the Russians and not just thinking about their interests. If the two-US and Europe- can do it regardsless of what will be the consequences then I think it will be easier for them to ask Russian government to negotiate with the Iranian Islamic regime.

Again negotiation should not involve preconditions and it should be directly addressed to the ruling islamic authority -the "welayatul-fagheh." The timing of talk with Tehran and the need to completely understand the history of Iranian-US relations should embody any future negotiations. The Americans should learn history and not rely on false information provided by any american associated institutions that promote not the general interests of the American people but by just the small segment of ruling American political elite with business interests in the region.

I believe Mr. Obama can deliver this issue for as long as its administration is sorrounded by dedicated and honest personalities who really are willing to address what is best for America and for the World.



 
O  I

May 9, 2009

  • 1
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Great. It sounds like double standarts politics. And it also seems superficial. No stability can be brought to Europe by NATO's expansion. Ukraine and Georgia are the countries, that seek teasing Russia. And Russia's invasion to Georgia was a response to military invasion of Georgia to South Ossetia. And that were peacekeeping forces (like those American forces in some well-known countries), which were to protect common people.
And the USA has forgotten its promise not to go forward with NATO's expantion. What do you think? Is it honest? Is there an agressive Russia? or the United States, which cares only for its own intersts, and calls another countries "agressive" because they pursue their national interests too.
Tags: | US-Russian relations |
 
Fabian Martin Lieschke

June 9, 2009

  • 0
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Thanks for all your comments...Some more food for thought:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/08/AR2...

Fabian
 

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org


Community

You are in the archive of all articles published on atlantic-community.org from 2007 to 2012. To read the latest articles from our open think tank and network with community members, please go to our new website