Anders Fogh Rasmussen has won the Afghan War. When he became Secretary General of NATO on the 1st of August, 2009, he took over an organization that was threatened by severe "Afghanistan depression." The Alliance appeared to be over extended. Neither the military mission nor the civil reconstruction projects were progressing, the Americans, Dutch and Canadians started to commit themselves to plans for withdrawal, and many experts said that failure at the Hindu Kush would mean the end of the Alliance.  

A year and a half later, everything is different. Rasmussen has delivered his masterpiece, the new NATO Strategic Concept. Since the Lisbon Summit of November 2010, the Brussels headquarters has been working on dozens of tasks, including nuclear planning, partnership programs and Russia. At international conferences, the subject of Afghanistan is now only a side issue. What has happened?

For one thing, the foreseeable withdrawal date of 2014 has taken a lot of pressure out of the debate. The American President set this date for domestic political reasons and NATO has basically followed his lead.

Secondly, as former Danish Prime Minister, Rasmussen has used direct contact with his former colleagues to bring political debate back to NATO. Where previously NATO ambassadors used to administer the Alliance's business, now this has been replaced by top-level dialogue. The goal of making NATO more political has come closer.

In addition, the missile defense issue has apparently added momentum to deadlocked relations with Russia. Most importantly however, is that NATO is proving to be a system which learns from experience, particularly in Afghanistan. Instead of staring hypnotized by the deterioration of its position, the Alliance has used it as a turning point to reorient itself.   

This has begun with the gradual reduction of goals in Afghanistan. The original objective was to eliminate safe havens for terrorist groups. But soon after the rapid victory of American troops over the ruling Taliban, the mission became overburdened with noble, but unrealistic goals of democratization and reconstruction, especially for the US.

Since 2009, these excessive expectations have been scaled down significantly. Instead of seeking a model democracy and the rule of law, the following is essential: Basic stability, protection of the population, infrastructural development, and the creation of halfway functional and self sustaining security organs.

This is still ambitious, but not impossible from the outset. This reduction of the "level of ambition" appears to be setting the tone for all of NATO. In the new Strategic Concept, NATO describes itself explicitly as a regional Alliance. This is a clear rejection of dreams of a global NATO, which were prevalent particularly in America a few years ago. 

Observers agree that a second Afghanistan, another long term commitment far away from the Alliance's territory will not come about so soon. This is not just because the Member States have no political desire, but also because shrinking budgets and smaller armies leave less room for maneuver in the future.

The Western Alliance will not fall apart, but it will get relatively weaker. Thus, the development of NATO is an indicator of the diminished influence of the West, which must accept its geopolitical strength. In which way this development encourages other global actors to expand their areas of action remains to be seen.

Secondly, NATO has used Afghanistan to adapt to its new understanding of war. With the concept of networked security (the comprehensive approach), planners pay tribute to the realization that modern, asymmetric conflicts cannot be won by military means alone. An intelligent mix of military and civilian expertise must be found and implemented.

This is nothing short of a small cultural revolution in security policy, which demands that all parties involved (diplomats, aid workers, soldiers and representatives of non-governmental organizations) have a substantial willingness to change.

This change in doctrine applies also to the increasing importance of strategic communication (StratComm) for the military. If the perception of facts is as important as the facts themselves, and if Al-Qaeda's global presence is due solely to its clever media strategy, then the strategic use of military communication is as critical as the classical "kinetic" craft.

Thirdly, Afghanistan has welded NATO together in ways previously unexpected. The mission has integrated the Member States that joined since 1999 more deeply into Alliance structures than maneuvers and staff exercises could have ever done. In addition, mutual understanding through local military cooperation and a sense of Alliance solidarity has been enormously advanced. The members know more about each other, have learned important lessons together and in some cases have risked their lives for one another.

These "soft" side effects are the opposite of the lessons of the "great policy" and are irreplaceable for the cohesion of the military alliance.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen has instinctively made the fundamental changes, which were underway before his arrival, his own. Instead of losing the debate about the future of NATO with the Afghanistan, he has tried to make the mission the starting point for the future of the Alliance. He has made his pale predecessors long forgotten and he now confronts government leaders at eye level. No question, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has won the war in Afghanistan.

Jan Techau, b. 1972, is Director of Carnegie Europe at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a 1999/2000 Fellow of the Postgraduate Program in International Affairs, the predecessor of the Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs. He has been working in the Research Division of the NATO Defense College in Rome and, headed the Alfred von Oppenheim Centre for European Studies at the German Society for Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. From 2001 - 2006 he was employed as security policy editor and later as a speaker at the Press and Information Department of the German Ministry of Defense.  The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.

Download this article as a PDF.

This article was written for ad hoc international, the joint biannual journal of the Network for international Affairs (NefiA) and the CSP Network for International Politics and Co-Operation. NefiA is the Alumni network of the Mercator Fellowship on International Affairs as well as the former Postgraduate Program in International Affairs. You can read the entire issue of ad hoc international in the German original: Afghanistan: Persönlich - Positiv -Kritisch.

Translation by Eoin Heaney

April 5, 2011

Felix F. Seidler, PhD Student (CAU Kiel), Blogger, Platinum Contributor (344)

• 2
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

Dear Jan Techau,

Thank you for the great article.

Mr. Rasmussen truly “delivered his masterpiece”. One has to keep in mind that he wrote the draft, based on the Albright-Report, alone during his summer holidays. Furthermore, Mr. Rasmussen managed the process to run without serious political tensions within NATO. It is visible that NATO, therefore, needs a CEO like Mr. Rasmussen more than secretary general. Furthermore, Rasmussen´s major merit was to adapt the alliance to emerging security challenges; not only within the strategic concept, but rather in the upcoming single strategies handling each emerging security challenge.

However, I do not see a complete NATO withdrawal in 2014. Afghanistan and NATO signed an agreement for a long term partnership in Lisbon. Probably, the alliance will declare that ISAF has been successful, but stay at the Hindkush under a new training and support mission label. In a press conference after Lisbon Barack Obama himself said, moreover, a US presence in Afghanistan beyond 2014 is likely. Thus, state´s declarations of success are not the issue. Instead, the question is whether people throughout all NATO countries trust in government´s statements.

NATO, however, may not become a global organization by membership. Opening NATO for states all over the globe would require a reform NATO treaty´s 10th paragraph. Consensus, therefore, will not occur. Nonetheless, NATO does not need to become a global organization by membership. Turkey´s foreign minister wrote before the Lisbon summit „NATO is on its way to become a global organization”(1). He is right because NATO has its four contact countries (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) and is seeking further partners. Furthermore, NATO is seeking a security dialogue with India and China. Recently, NATO announced on Facebook that the organization has sent a high level official to an Asian security conference in Indonesia. “Partnerships” is one of the strategic concepts “red lines”, which means the alliance will become a global organization by action not by members. The concepts preamble says NATO wants “to help to promote common security with our partners around the globe”. Actions and promotion may not mean direct military engagement like at the Horn of Africa. Instead, security sector cooperation or joint exercises, like one Standing Naval Maritime Group did with the South African Navy, will be one of these global activities. Moreover, China is said to be curious about cooperation with NATO because its armed forces have no experience with joint operations and seek for such knowledge.

Yes, Western influence in the world is diminishing. However, “lean back and to nothing” cannot be an option. Hence, I believe NATO partners have to deepening their partnerships. Acting together worldwide, whether under NATO label or not, will at least help to slow down Western geopolitical loss.

(1): Gönül, Vecdi (2010): Turkey-NATO Relations and NATO´s New Strategic Concept, S. 18.

April 6, 2011

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

• 3
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

I find it quite courageous to call minimising the goals in Afghanistan a "victory".

In essence, NATO radically downscaled its ambitions at the Hindukush. Unfortunately, it is right on the same track as western (colonial) powers were all too often in Middle Eastern countries: installing a regime that can somehow provide a minimum of order and stability, and that's it. No matter if Karzai stays in office despite election fraud, or is involved in drug trade. At least he's not a Taliban... but I doubt this will bear the long-term fruits that NATO hoped for.

Whether the NATO mission will be successful remains to be seem - and certainly depends strongly on the definition of 'success'. To me, it merely appears that NATO currently engages in a face-keeping mission, that is: re-labeling defeat into a "victory". If we can learn something, then that western military power could not do what we expected.

But Fogh Rasmussen was certainly successful in restoring cohesion within the alliance by curbing its all too global ambitions. That is success with regard to the greater strategic picture. But Afghanistan is certainly not a "victory" of the alliance - if it won't become its graveyard, it at least showed clearly the limits of the western powers and marks the reduction of its influence on global scale.

Last but not least, I thought NATO is on a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. At least in Germany we are repeatedly told that we are not fighting a war (against whom would be interesting as well), but that our troops are there to maintain order, but meet "war-like" combat situations.

Declaring Rasmussen "The Winner of the Afghanistan War" in the style of a Roman imperator has some irony.

April 6, 2011

Jerzy S Deren, strategic analyst, DSW University of Lower Silesia Wroclaw visiting professor, Silver Contributor (43)

• 4
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

" No question, Anders Fogh Rasmussen has won the war in Afghanistan." With all respect to the Author I cannot agree for such propaganda! Author has not possessed even theoretical knowledge and sufficient background on C2 and operational issues in the ISAF and OEF AOR to conduct such assessment. There is no room for such lecture; however telling about victory is too much!

April 11, 2011

Eva Maria Krockow, GIZ, Ghana, Platinum Contributor (209)

• 2
•  
•  
• 
• 

I like this comment! What's this?

Dear Mr. Techau,

Thank you for this very interesting and well-written article. I very much agree with your interpretation of NATO’s gradual loss of strength and influence as a general indicator of political trends rather than as the alliance’s defeat. I share your view that NATO can only be as strong as its member states, which have lost in international standing against the background of emerging powers such as China, India, and Brazil. Therefore, I commend NATO’s gradual retreat from engagement in wider international conflicts. This should not be understood as the alliance’s failure or as ‘leaning back and doing nothing’ (as suggested by Mr. Seidler) but as sensible and adequate strategy to ensure efficient and appropriate intervention in the future. Mr. Seidler’s proposal for a deepening of partnerships, however, is a very important point and should be further explored.

Commenting has been deactivated in the archive. We appreciate your comments on our more recent articles at atlantic-community.org