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June 6, 2012

Gökhan Tekir, Bilkent University, Gold Contributor (101)

Dear Tabish,
It is an inspiring article. I agree that the intervention to Syria is inevitable especially after the collapse of Annan Plan. Russia and China lack the excuse for their call for non-intervention now. Houla massacre showed that Assad regime is determined to wipe out opposition by all means. However, I find the possibility of intervention of NATO rather weak.
The upcoming elections in the USA deters Obama from engaging in a risky intervention. The EU members of NATO concentrated on their economic problems. The administrations of these countries would be in difficult situation in explaining a costly intervention even for humanitarian reasons while imposing austerity measures to their citizens. Furthermore, the reminiscents of Iraq invasion is still fresh in the minds of the people of the Middle East region. Another foreign intervention will not be met enthusiastically.
The most likely situation will be the intervention of Arab League forces with the approval of the United Nations. Turkey may also participate these forces by extending its logistical support . The legitimacy of the intervention of Arab forces will be higher than the intervention of NATO. China which needs oil for its industry will avoid antagonizing Arab countries. A failed state does not benefit Russia so the increasing anarchic environment in Syria will urge Russia to cooperate with other regional forces. After the presidential elections Russia softened its position concerning Syria. When Annan plan which was the last diplomatic attempt failed, I expect Russia to be more conciliatory with the Arab League members which demand the regime change in Syria.

June 6, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Dear Gokhan,

Thanks very much for your positive comments about the article and providing your views, it is definitely material for thought.

A few points concerning the politics of an intervention for Obama: The Iran issue is one of the 5 main points in the election - intervention is a wild card - contrary to the idea that a US-led intervention would be costly for Obama, wars enhance patriotism and support for a leader, and electorates tend not to change administrations during times of War. Nixon himself said that Bush's biggest mistake was not to extend the war by a year. If this were simply about Syria, this couldn't be a wild card for him in the election, but the fact that it involves removing Iranian and Hezbollah influence from the region makes it viable. If a package could be offered to encourage Syrian troops to defect, it would be even less of a risk for him. Furthermore, if there is no resolution in the next 4 months whomever is elected cannot continue to kick the Iran can further away. Obama's campaign is also well aware and well versed in making the point that the US is not actually in recession at the moment and unemployment has indeed been falling (except for the last month where figures show it increased by .1 percent) and a case for the trade and economic partnerships that could come out of removing Assad's regime could also be made alongside the Iran aspect.

In terms of reception to the invasion, assistance in Libya was met with positive reactions from its citizens and if Turkey were to be involved that would further smooth the reaction of Syrians. The Arab League would lack the capabilities to deal with Iran and Hezbollah's involvement alone (I don't think Turkey would commit enough assistance without it being a NATO-led intervention), it's also unlikely would also not want to risk upsetting dynamics in their own back yard.

All in all, I agree that it will take a strong leader to commit to an intervention but at the same time there are strong reasons that are in NATO states' interests to do so.

Tabish

June 6, 2012

Dmitry Stefanovich, The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) , Silver Contributor (65)

Dear Tabish,
You've written a very impressive article. However, your overall stance seem rather doubtful.
Putting aside the overall attitude and rhethoric towards Syria, Assad, Iran, Hezbollah, Egypt and Lybia (personally, I don't see how "moral case for intervention in Syria speaks for itself"), I'd like to ask for clarification of very "hard" points:
1 )Could you please name any "security, economic, and political interests" that are shared by "civilians in the region and NATO allies"?
2) Moreover, your statement that "with a weaker Iran and Hezbollah, a range of opportunities and partnerships that increase NATO states' political and economic influence and interests would emerge" requires much more proofs. How will _another_ military conflict and probably couple more failed states will help NATO members? How will NATO and US explain the enormous expenditures on BMD (with money already spent and much more - planned) in a case of weaker Iran?
3) Another interesting idea - "for there to be a regime-change in Syria that benefits NATO states, the Allies could present negotiations that would encourage defection from the Syrian army in order for a pro-NATO opposition ground-force to emerge" - is a direct road for Syria to ask for UNSC assistance, as such negotiations will be nothing else but an act of aggression against a sovereign state. And NATO here will be an aggressor from any point of view based on International Law (not very much respected these days).

June 6, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Dear Dmitry,

Thanks very much for your positive comments and providing your feedback; it is great to get a Russian perspective.

I cover your questions in my longer academic pieces, I will succinctly answer them here:

Imposing a military defeat will cut off the arms supply from Iran to its proxy Hezbollah substantially diminishing their influence whilst ending the massacre of civilians and the eruption of civil war that would last for years and as a by-product also decrease the influence of countries that are providing those arms. That is in NATO interests and civilian interests. There is no argument that allowing the Assad regime,Iran, and Hezbollah a strong position in the area is in NATO States' interests or civilians' interests in the region - it isn't. Secondly, the grassroots palestinian population would accept a one state solution to the Israel issue, self-interested elites within the Iranian Gov, Hezbollah and Hamas would not and create rhetoric to maintain that. Pursuing an opportunity to remove some of the obstacles to genuine stability is in NATO allies and civilians interests to allow for safety, security, and economic interests to be developed.

Economic possibilities include: various forms of trade, further development of renewable energy projects such as DESERTEC that are currently being pursued using solar energy within Arab States and therefore greater energy security, weakening the leverage of natural gas providers so situations such as blocking interventions after all other options have been exhausted cannot occur; job creation; manufacturing potential; decreased defence expenditure in the long-term; stability in the region encouraging investment and therefore growth.

Your final point concerning sovereignty: The law is understood as a mechanism to protect the civilians and to ensure standards of behaviour amongst the international community are upheld. That is not happening in Syria.

June 7, 2012

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)

It is hard for me to share even the most basic premises of this article.
As a starting point, I would not reduce the strategic landscape of the Middle East to Iran/Syria/Hezbollah (to which one might add Iraq, by the way) against the rest. Among the different players, radical Sunnis like Saudi Arabia (though linked to the US) and different outlets of the Muslim Brotherhood (like Hamas) increasingly form one veritable block not unproblemativ to Western and especially Israeli security interests (by the way, not Iran and Hizbullah, but the radical Sunnis were the primary reason why we became entangled in the region after 09/11). That Hamas, a member of the latter block, also had an overall good connection to Iran (a member of the "heretic" shiite camp) pretty much until the beginning of the Syrian civil war, shows how complicated (and how fragile) alliances and conflicts develop specifically in this landscvape.
The possible fall of the secular Alawite system in Syria (a rather unlikely and over time often enough obstinate ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, by the way), while surely a certain setback to Iran, would through the enormous strengthening of Sunni radicals create other strategic problems for the West. This especially because the more protracted and bloody a revolution/civil-war becomes, as a general rule, the more the radical elements among the victors gain influence. The enormous contribution of blood specifically of the Syrian Muslim brotherhood since the 1970s would significantly legitimate their claim to power. Iran, on the other hand, having Iraq, does not so much need Syria. Concerning Hizbullah, if the Lebanese Christians, frightened by the Syrian insurgents and their lebanese Sunni allies' anti-Christian, anti-Shiite and anti-Alawi standings, seek an ever closer alliance to the lebanese Shia, Hizbullah (already a dominant political force in Lebanon) might even emerge strengthened from such a regime -change across the border. Syria as a transit-route from Iran was desparately needed for Hizbullah only as long as it did not have any access to the Lebanese state, which it is now long since part of.

The arguments regarding the possible ground-invasion somewhat frightened me. This thinking was en vogue in some circles prior to 2003, but it should have been discredited by everything which we all saw since then. Yes, it is possible to invade other countries, but military action is a tool towards political goals. Negative goals (we do not want X in power) are achievable, positive goals (We do want Y in power as well as Z political conditions) are nearly unachievable. And yes, the costs for the invader do not remotely match the benefits (see: Afghanistan, Iraq) even without financial crisis.

I, too, can not see any "moral cause" for intervention speaking for itself. Maybe this is because I live in Afghanistan. Here, too, we have a brutal insurgency and a brutal counterinsurgency. People die every day on both sides, and many civilians too. Some of the latter are collateral damage, some are directloy targeted. Yet, while we and the Karzai regime and the militias supported by us do kill people (sometimes many at a time) and do committ sometimes horrendous crimes (especially the militias), I would surely hope that no one supported an intervention in Afghanistan against Karzai, NATO and our militia-allies? And this not only because most statistics (no one in his right mind would trust a statistic from a battlefield) claim that our enemies kill somewhat more civilians.
Again, the lesson of this war here in Afghanistan is that military intervention is rarely to the benefit of the people unhappy enough to live in the area. A swift victory of the insurgents, probably followed by group-violence and ethnic cleansing against Syrian Alawites and Christians would be one possible outcome of intervention - with probably the more radical Sunni forces (...whom we tried to diminish in importance after 09/11...) triumphant. The moral case for this outcome does not speek for itself, at least for me, akthough it might be acceptacle depending on which scale one applies. Another outcome would be Syrias ethnic and religious minorities fighting back, thus either stubbornly preventing an outright downfall of the current regime, or through a protracted insurgency/civil war after such a change of power in Damascus. Again, this would rather not be to the benefit of the Syrian people - and the more the West would already be engaged, the higher the chance to be again drawn into an all-out intervention. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while already problematic from a perspective which centers on the interests of the staes involved, given the sufferings of teh civil population and the enormous bloodshed are surely no "moral case speaking for itself".

All in all, military power is a very crude tool to advance political goals in a very complicated world with many players, many conflicting interests as well as a lot of unforeseen turns and changes. It is not a silver bullet to achieve these goals. This, the last several thousand years of history - at the very least the last ten years and the Western wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya (but also the Syrian regimes efforts to crush the opposition, which started rather peaceful) should have shown. The very idea "we need to do something", if it leeds to "let's use the military", must be followed by a very thorough assessment of ends, means and ways to achieve these end by the means available, as well as of the costs to everyone involved. As a rule, "best-case scenarios" rarely become true. On the contrary, I would argue that the more you know of military power and the closer you came to its application in practice, the more humble an instrument you will see it, specifically if applied abroad. Given the complicated alliances and dynamics of the region, I shudder at the though of us even contemplating to join the stage militarily in this civil-war.

June 7, 2012

Dmitry Stefanovich, The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) , Silver Contributor (65)

Dear Tabish, thank you for answers.
Nevertheless, I still have many doubts.
1) "Imposing a military defeat will cut off the arms supply from Iran to its proxy Hezbollah substantially diminishing their influence whilst ending the massacre of civilians and the eruption of civil war that would last for years and as a by-product also decrease the influence of countries that are providing those arms." If we speak about "partial defeat" of Iran and Hezbollah (with possibility of their participation in the conflict still very vague), the result may be exactly opposite, pretty much in the fashion of Germany after Versailles'1919. And I am absolutely sure that arms suppliers will flourish arming the revenge-seeking actors, instead of facing influence decrease.
2) Economic possibilities - well, energy security for Arab states will not assist energy security for Europe, and for decreased defence spendings - my vision is quite the opposite.
3) International law is, first of all, rules of conduct among nations. And direct support of rebels in a sovereign state because of "morality" is absolutely unacceptable, as there is no such thing as "international moral".

Dear Florian, it is a great pleasure to read such a detailed comment from a professional. "The more you know of military power and the closer you came to its application in practice, the more humble an instrument you will see it" - one can't say better.

June 7, 2012

Alexander Corbeil, Atlantic Council of Canada, Gold Contributor (101)

Great article Tabish,

You bring up many interesting points regarding the benefits of intervention in Syria, particularly when it comes to changing the balance of power in the region. With the future of Iranian and Hezbollah power in the region tied up with Assad and his ability to maintain power in Syria it would seem that some sort of intervention would be called for. Also, there is some merit to your argument that if there was to be an intervention military units and commanders would need to be coerced into defection to allow for an organized pro-NATO contingent on the ground.---but this would be a difficult and fragmented process given the fact that many top ranking soldiers, the security forces, and feared Shabiha militia would remain loyal to Assad out of sectarian linkage.

I do not believe that an intervention in Syria (whether through air or ground operations) would result in a quick defeat of the Assad regime. Furthermore, it would surely create the conditions for a spillover of violence in neighbouring Lebanon, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Jordan. We have witnessed sectarian clashes in the Lebanese city of Tripoli that would surely be exacerbated by the Assad regime if it feels threatened. Iran for its part would also step up clandestine operations in order to target Western interests in the region, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza.

Hezbollah and Iran would not be forced to supply ground troops in any surmountable sense. Rather, guerilla and insurgent tactics would be utilized as a last ditch effort to support Assad and/or ensure a destabilized transition period. There is no tactical defeat scenario for Hezbollah and Iran in Syria, and while the fall of Assad would severely weaken both actors, the destabilization effects both within Syria and for the entire Levant and Gulf regions would cause a large power vacuum. From this ungovernable space sectarian violence, the rise of militant groups, and increased hatred against the West would flourish.
Iran would be further emboldened to stoke sectarian tensions: having lost a crucial state ally and the ability to transfer arms and money to its proxy in Lebanon; not to mention being under crippling sanctions by the international community.

Syria's internal situation is getting worse and will continue to do so. The proxy war playing out between the West and Gulf States against Russia, Iran and its proxies will at minimum take a year to unfold. That being said, it is intensifying to the point that the Free Syrian Army is routing Syrian forces in key strategic areas. Diplomatic pressure on Russia is making Moscow slowly change its stance on Assad---we should wait to see how both of these factors play out before hastily calling for intervention.

June 7, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Thanks very much to all of you for the positive comments and it's great to see such detailed feedback.

Dmitry: DESERTEC and other potential projects concern energy security for western states. Concerning other issues; you've restated the same arguments so i would re-direct you to my article and previous comments which dealt with them- you should bear in mind the broader point when you read it however: the rule of law and human rights are not upheld by certain countries domestically with some countries not even allowing a free press and corruption rampant and freedom of speech severely curtailed, but NATO doesn't intervene. The point is NATO states interests and values can merge in Syria - leaders have a responsibility to their own citizens to plan and do things responsibly. I do agree however that it's good to hear from those with experience in Afghanistan; hopefully lessons will be learned from miscalculated decisions and the losses incurred from NATO strategy there.

The idea that a solution in which Assad remains in power will have any legitimacy in Syria is incorrect. A civil war will emerge. If our aim is to avoid this outcome whilst also the Syrian regime it's in NATO allies interests to commit to a ground intervention or to negotiate something that encourages the defection so that the ground-force is made of up of Pro-west Syrians. It would require commitment, but not anywhere near the amount of time as Iraq or Afghanistan if the lessons are learned from mistakes that were repeatedly made in those conflicts. This is particularly so If Turkey could be negotiated with to commit to providing a substantial number of ground troops.

Iran would have no leverage whatsoever if they did not have a stake in syria and lebanon via hezbollah, therefore the probability of them taking the opportunity to flood syria with troops or insurgents would be high. If not, even better as you have the ability to remove Iran/Hezb influence without engaging with them militarily. Then you have two actors out of the way that are part of why other issues like the peace process cannot be resolved.

Sectarianism is an issue but one that is overplayed. We need to ask: Who is stoking up the sectarianism? Iran and Hezbollah elites who rely on this to 'scare' NATO states away from intervening. At the grassroots level of societies, people avoid collective or political mobilisation unless it is the very last option - create a stable secure environment in with safety and socio-economic opportunities rather than the careless approach in the aftermath of Iraq, and regardless of who is providing that safety etc, elites fostering divisions and sectarianism will not have enough legitimacy to cause people to actually take up the burden of mobilising. I fully agree that all possible non-military solutions should be exhausted, but the reality is that if Assad's regime doesn't fall, the conflict even if temporarily resolved will end up protracted - that is to no one's gain. We have a massive resource in NATO if we use it properly - the technical, political and military expertise that is pooled through it can be used to avoid that situation as well as severely reduce the influence of actors in the area that benefit from it to our detriment.

June 8, 2012

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)

Both the grand strategical situation and our understanding of what is really happening on the ground should be judged with a certain sense of humbleness. Who does really know what is going on? The German conservative newspaper FAZ today (http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/neue-erkenntnisse-zu-getoeteten-...) reported about "credible" reports, based on statements from the side of the opposition, that those killed in the now famous Hula massacre were Alawites and Shiites - and their killers quite likely insurgents, not the regime (which has internationally been blamed). That might be true - or not. We do not know. But for sure, statements by the Syrian opposition and insurgents have more often than not been taken at face value here in the West while everything coming from the regim has been rejected out of hand. Again, comparing this to Afghanistan, imagine just for one second how your view of this war would be if just the Talibans' claims and statements were given as much credibility as everyone describing himself as Syrian opposition. It is hard for me to take any claims of absolute knowledge serious, even from people inside Syria, much more from everyone of us who is not there.

The lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan for me and many people of the same background and much smarter than me are less operational (do this and that to avoid the outbreak of an insurgency or finish it off quickly) but either tactical (do this and that against an insurgency in order to weaken and after many years probably overcome it) or strategical (avoid bringing yourself into a situation where you find yourself facing an insurgency). And again, what these wars have taught us is that ordinary people and whole communities need not elites to foster divisions and sectarianism. Even if for one second (and against all odds) we pretend that until now it is just the regime and its Alawite, Shiite and Christian supporters and not the Sunni insurgents who commit violence against civilians, we would surely see emotions running high on the side of the Sunnis who would dominate the future Syria. If emotions run high, for many months and years blood has been shed - and the account for decades of minority rule, misuse of power, oppression and past martyrs (Hama 1982) waits to be paid, it is a quite natural response of ordinary people to make the defeated feel their defeat. If you cannot kill Assad, kill one from his tribe, kill a fellow Alawite or a Shia or a Sunni who collaborated with Assad (or of whom you heard that he collaborated or whose house/ wealth/ shop/ car you want). This is what Lebanon witnessed throughout the late 1970s and 1980s once violence had crossed a critical level, that is what Iraq saw after 2003, this is what we saw (and will probably continue to see) in Afghanistan. Today in Libya, although the TV cameras have already moved on, the bloodshed has not ended, although the association with the Qadhdhafi clan is much less obvious than in the case of Syria.

Exactly that it will likely become messy after a victory of the insurgents and that a quite large pool of Syrians associated with the regime by sectarian association for decades stands as a ready target for the settling of old bills with the regime makes the probability of some form of mass violence and civil war quite likely. Iran could lean back and watch - bringing in more than a handful of specialists would not be useful. Iranians, not speaking the local language and not able to blend in with the local population would be as fit for a guerrilla war as would be Brits or Germans in China. Hizbullah would probably be able to provide mid-level assistance (including some volunrtaries) as well as in the Beka'a the same safe havens behind the border that Sunni Syrian insurgents now enjoy in Sunni Northern Lebanon. Iraqi Shias (who rule the country) might also feel compelled to provide assistance, especially given that hated Saudi-Arabia would probably be a main ally of a Sunni Syria. This could more than easily lead to the escalation of the war into Lebanon (where the Sunnis are a minority and probably not in a position to challenge Hizbullah and its Christian allies) and possibly (and to a lower extent) into Iraq. Ugly enough, but the more open the West would be involved, the more ugly and messy it would become.

In sum, that's why I argue to apply the strategic lesson from Iraq and Afghanistan - don't enter this kind of war carelessly - if at all. Our mighty ressources are of little use in an anti-guerrilla war and with a very high likelihood we would again just pay an enormous bill (in our own wealth and the lives and blood of other people abroad) for achieving things we did not intend and strengthening people we belatedly will discover do not share our political goals.

June 8, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Thanks a lot for the detailed comment again.

The bottom line is: after an objective cost-benefit analysis of the Syria situation, the benefits outweigh the costs for intervention. If Turkey were to commit around 100,000 troops alongside or negotiations with the outcome of syrian troops defection.

The failures of those previously and currently formulating strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq are clear to see and should be taken into account. I think the best way to assess those failures is by those who are outside of having made those decisions and can be objective about those decisions, and objective about why people mobilise, including causes of mobilising through 'sectarian' lines.

To reiterate, at the grassroots level, if security safety and socio-economics are being provided for without expecting a change of culture or ideology in return, populations will not mobilise against whoever is best providing them, regardless of whether it is NATO countries or actors like the Taliban and Hezb.

Objectively, long-term interests and values can merge in Syria if NATO resources and capabilities are used carefully and responsibly, if we are aware of our limitations and strengths based on analysis of past conflicts - what type of theatre was Libya? What led to success there? You can ask these questions of less successful military operations and begin to learn what to do and what not to do in Syria.

Tabish

June 8, 2012

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

I would like to thank Dmitry Stefanovich, and especially Florian Broschk, for their very insightful comments.

The information war about Syria is already in full swing. Everything must be done to prevent it from developing into a real war. The Assad regime might be brutal, but it is, at least, to some degree predictable. Because of this, I got the impression that e.g. many Israelis still hope that the regime will survive. Radical Islamist are much more a threat than the Alawites (which currently probably fight to death because they assume they are all being slaughtered if they lose).

This is not to excuse the brutality of the regime, but to warn that the military can 'fix' the situation. Let's finally learn the lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya (many arms from Libya, by the way, are no in the hands of al-Qaeda groups in Sinai, much to the dismay of Israel).

There is no 'clean military solution', at least not in the Middle East. Syria is really risky: like WW I, this might develop into a large war which nobody wanted but which may just materialise if we don't prevent it.

Paul Smyth has written a quite realistic article about western policy options. We need patience and should not be distracted by images of some dead children. A military intervention in the current situation will unleash much greater horrors.

June 8, 2012

Jason Naselli, University of Essex, Platinum Contributor (208)

"We need patience and should not be distracted by images of some dead children."

I shudder to think what happens when one stops being "distracted" by children dying.

Is there a debate to be had about whether military intervention is a wise tactic? Yes. Is there a question of whether or not the international community has a responsibility to stop these killings? No... they undoubtedly DO have a responsibility to stop them.

I agree with Florian that sectarianism is a real issue and there needs to be care taken with backing any specific rebel group. But it should not be a reason to sit back and do nothing.

June 8, 2012

Niklas Anzinger, Student of Philosophy & Economics, Platinum Contributor (728)

Dear participants in the discussion,

Bernard Lucke, Florian Broschk and Paul Smyth have raised indeed very realistic concerns to a military option, yet I think they have all not taken one of the major points of Tabish Shah into account: the hostility and aggression of the Iranian regime (sending ground forces and intellectual assistance to crack down the uprising). As I read it, Tabish does not argue that a military option would be all clean and beneficial for all actors involved. Yet, this is neither how Iran and other parties (assumed Qatar, Saudi-Arabia etc.) calculate. Especially Iran has no moral constraints and the people are totally subject to the influence of actors who have no moral obligation at all to spare civilian life. In that sense, should Western allied forces getting involved not have the option to go against the long reach of Tehran and make the situation a little better? Is there much more to "destabilize"? In that case, about what kind of sick stability are we speaking of?

Yet, I do not wanna safe the military option because I am really not sure how this would be handed out. Without a plan, consent and commitment, such kind of action could really result in what the former comments described. Doing nothing does not work either and is possibly the worst option though. Letting Assad kill a few tens of thousands of people until we see this kind of grave silence again, like Saddam did after the First Gulf War, would be irresponsible.

June 9, 2012

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)

Jason Naselli -

"I shudder to think what happens when one stops being 'distracted' by children dying": Well, images of deads children we get for free from around the globe. Including dead children killed by Libyan rebels. Including scores of children killed by NATO in Afghanistan (latest: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57449428/nato-apologizes-for-af...). Or killed by the Taliban. Children are killed in Syria by the insurgents and by the governments. Yet, this is not an analytical category, much the less a substitute for sound strategical thinking: ends, means, ways... And I think we all agree, if we decide to enter the stage, children will get killed by our intervention - and their number can easily surpass the numbers of dead children following from the civil war raging now. Do we then also have a "responsibility to stop these killings" (though the images will likely not be braodcasted by our media when we ourselves are the culprit)? Do we militarily have to stop ourselves? Do we have a "responsibility to stop (the) killings" with regard to the civilians killed by ourselves in Afghanistan? No doubt that we put much more emphasis on avoiding civilian deads than the rather crude armies of the Syrian regime and the Syrian rebels both are able and willing. But again, in order to force them to fight and kill more discriminately, we might end up causing much more bloodshed and deads. That is why I support Bernhard Lucke's counterintuitive and seemingly cynical sentence. But again: reality tends to be much more cynical than this sentence, specifically if you use the military for seemingly humanitarian goals. Remember the old sentence? Killing for peace is like screwing for virginity. I am not per se against killing for political reasons (my biography clearly shows that I am even, more than willing to participate in this), but this should be based on clear political reasoning and not on emotional reactions to tiny snippets of visual information we get from a very complicated battlefield with many actors who relentllesly try to shape our opinion in their respective favor.

Niklas Anzinger -

we noted before that we disagree on the assessment of role and threat of Iran vis a vis the radical Sunnis, ranging from Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas to al-Qaeda. Iran for me is a minor regional middle power, the ability of which to project power abroad is limited to Lebanon, Iraq and parts of Afghanistan. Even nuclear energy - even the alleged nuclear weapon's program would not change that. Thus, Iran is now pretty much at the height of its possible regional power. With its Arab neighbours, the worlds sole global superpower and the regional superpower Israel firmly against it (including a not-so covert secret war and repetaed threats of open war), its economy stumbling, grave internal power-struggles and an increasingly narrower base even among supporters of the whole concept (the neoconservatives around Ahmadinezhad, one year before the end of his term, isolated by Khamenei with large parts of former regime elites already sidelined on the "pragnmatical-reformist" side), I see the Islamic Republic as on the defensive, occasionally still a nuisance but no threat to Israel and the West. The radical Sunnis, on the other hand, are on the rise, and their possible base of power extends from Morocco to Indonesia, as well as radicalised communities inside the West. From the point of grand-strategy, too, for me it would be foolish to needlessly and carelessly advance their cause in Syria. Especially given that the secular government of Syria, fighting for mere survival (literally for its own but probably also literally for that of its whole community) will be open for any compromise on foreign policy. Iran being detracted by investing into its stumbling (and as I pointed out never really close) ally is even not a bad thing for the West. In sum, for me there are many options how to influence the Syrian civil war and pretty much every one is better than an all-out confrontation with the regime, aiming at its downfall. Remember, it is not only Assad killing people, so regardless of who is to win, people will die anyway - and we are likely to see some form of 'graveyard-silence'. A spill-over into Lebanon or Iraq, while adding a lot of graveyards, would not avoid the 'silence' but not very much responsible either.

Trying to contain the civil-war by applying the little pressure available to both sides (and possibly and discretely lobby for a more nuanced and balanced coverage of the civil-war by Western media) still seems by far the best reaction for me from the Western side. It is somewhat like climate-change: it is not nice and a lot of cute polarbears are going to die. Still, there is little we can do to avoid it altogether and what we try might not change too much. Still, no one in his right mind would argue to use the military against climate change - forgive the ridiculous comparison. Just because we have a 'superb military' (as Mrs. Albright famously pointed out to Colin Powell in the 1990s) does not mean it is of any use in many, many scenarios.

June 10, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

First off, this article has gained a lot of feedback and thank you for that, however the point of the article is to look at the realistic options on the table, to work with what is happening, and to use sound judgement in order to find a solution.

With that mind, here is a round up and reiteration of the points:

1) The article is about taking the opportunity to merge interests and values. There are conflicts happening that we do not get involved with, because first and foremost we have a responsibility to our servicemen and woman and citizens to do not only what is right, but to be responsible in doing so and only pursue an option it if it is achievable. To put perhaps in its most simplest form, when you go ice fishing you are warned that if someone falls in, as much as you may want to help them, you cannot jump in as well as you will very likely become a victim yourself. This is about finding a solution to a problem whilst being responsible with NATO lives and capabilities. We should be leading by example here as we do in other areas like the rule of law etc that we have in our own countries.

2) Removing/severely weakening Iranian government and Hezbollah influence. The sectarian interests are weak at the grassroots level. You have an Ahmedinijad's regime using the israel bugbear to garner votes and support domestically. You have Hezbollah and Hamas elites and pro-hezbollah cultural elites creating an atmosphere and a rhetoric in favour of a two-state solution, because their vested interest is to have a state which they can be powerful within. The fact that this solution is so unlikely due to the paranoia created by their frequent border skirmishes and rhetoric, means they get keep their vested and power by simply protracting the israel-palestine issue. These two actors therefore are obstacles to broader NATO strategic political interests and to that of civilians at the grassroots or mass level of these societies. There are arabs in israel and even the knesset right now, remove the influence of individuals supporting and/or rhetoric and you have removed a substantial obstacle to resolving the israel palestine issue that is stifling broader development opportunities in the region.

3) As a knock-on effect of this, gaining influence in Syria is key to the development of other opportunities that are NATO interests and grassroots interests of civilians which i have outlined the article and my comments- this means there would not be mobilisation against an outside force after a carefully and responsibly executed intervention. We can also decrease the influence and leverage of other non-NATO actors that Europe relies on for natural gas.

4) Strategy - If someone can formulate a non-military solution with the same outcome, then i support that. However, if not, the article proposes we negotiate with Syrian forces to encourage defection and provide air support; if not, we act as an alliance and negotiate with Turkey to provide a substantial number of troops. People at the mass level of societies don't mobilise based on their religion unless they think their immediate circumstances regarding safety and security and cultural/religious autonomy are being limited as a result of it - regardless of who the hegemon is. Without Syria/Hezbollah/Israel, Iran would have very little influence. If sectarianism were as big an issue as thought of, you wouldn't have had multi-ethnic and religiously diverse empires existing for centuries and collapsing when cultural and religious autonomy was infringed upon, and most multi-ethnic western societies would be facing uprisings by now. The Arab Spring was not caused by sectarianism, it was caused by a deterioration in economics and human rights.

Furthermore, when people have been involved in formulating strategies that have continuously failed repeatedly for 10+ years leaving NATO states weaker, this substantially calls into question their strategic abilities when they have consistently got it wrong. This is a conflict that NATO States' can find a solution to that is in our interests; there is no gain for anyone to defend entrenched positions and ways of thinking that have weakened NATO states in order to save face. Lets look forward as an alliance and concentrate on finding solutions.

June 11, 2012

Florian Broschk, Security Advisor, Northern Afghanistan, Platinum Contributor (197)

I realise that I have been too much involved in this debate already, but as I will not be online for some time, this will be my final post on that matter. And I appreciate that you are trying to come back to the main points of your debates. As we disagree on pretty much everything, I think, before leaving the debate, I will also clarify my position:

1) I adamantly oppose your suggestion that values and interests for NATO would merge in case of an open intervention (especially a military one) in Syria. As I pointed out, the moral case for an intervention against the regime ("values") is dubious at best, taking into account the very narrow base of information we have (unverified media report, mostly based on statements of one of the warring parties). Taking into account also the potential outcome, the moral case becomes untenable in all but the best-case scenario (a quick victory followed by calm). I see little that would make me optimistic concerning this best-case scenario and would not base strategic thinking on it. The same goes of course for our interests: the current scenario of an ongoing civil-war is not particularly attractive; becoming entangled in it seems all the more detrimonial to our interests for me. Thus, I would say, counterintuitively doing "nothing" (as supporters of a war might call it) seems the best merging of interests and values, with subtle efforts to influence the overall situation.

2) I am not completely sure what you mean with regard to Iranian/Hizbullah influence. Do you mean to remove it from Syria? Or from the wole region?
The first, I would argue, was never really strong (the IR Iran and secular Baathist Syria were allied, but often enough at odds; since the emerging of the new Iraq, the latter has probably by far surpassed Syria as the most important, though again not unproblematic ally; Hizbullah famously fought Syria's ally Amal and now maintains a rather uncordial with the latter) inside Syria nor that much relevant for us. Plus, it would be much easier and cheaper to diminish by a political bargain with the stumbling Assad-regime.
The second - the regional influence of Iran, Iraq and the Lebanese Shia - will of course not be removed just by removing Syria. Iran as well as Hizbullah are (relatively) strong for their own reasons and do not need Syria. Plus, as I have argued before, I am rather sure that the influence of Hizbullah inside Lebanon as well as their grip on the Lebanese Shia (as well as their Christian allies' grip of the Lebanese Christians) would surge after a shift of power towards the Sunnis across the border. And I would firmly warn against disregarding the very real threat of a radical-Sunni camp encompassing not only Saudi-Arabia, the various outlets of the Muslim brotherhood (such as Hamas), but also Egypt and (then) Syria. Israelis will need strong nerves, should that scenario ever unfold.

3) No resistance against outside intervention is the dream of every intervening military, but dreams not always come true. Unfortunately. There might exist theories why it could be avoided, however, given not only our recent experiences but especially the situation after a possible defeat of the Alawite regime (grim sectarian faultlines with an enraged, dominant Sunni population posed against Alawites, Christians and Shiites - and with well-armed allies of the weaker side just across the borders) it is hard for me to trust your assertion.

4) Strategy - I think you are right that no obvious strategy, leading to a pleasant endstate in any short or medium term, seems to exist. Still, I would argue for accepting the limits of our power and looking for the most acceptable of many bad (but realistic) options. I am afraid, that (just like in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) we in the West do not understand much of the complex dynamics of the war, thus as a general rule I would suppose that the more direct and the more violent possible Western intervention would be, the more harm it would create.

Concerning your final point, again I am not completely sure which people you refer to, but I do sincerely support that argument with regard to policy. The two disastrous wars (and also the third one in Libya, which however was less a disaster so far but a nuisance: medium costs but little benefits) we fought, in my opinion not so much discredit the interventionists who argued for them (as you seem to suggest), but their policies. Thus, while even people who formulated the strategies that brought us into these wars and the underlying axioms ("Iraqis will greet us as liberators, not as occupiers", "Afghanistan will be easy") can and should be part of the debate on Syria, we should be very careful regarding their old arguments now warmed up again.

June 11, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

To finish up:

Sectarianism: Because of how wrong strategy was towards Afghanistan and Iraq, there is tendency amongst strategists to be almost overly cautious now. Sectarianism, although existing in pockets, was exacerbated by ill-thought out military action in those countries. Consequently, sectarianism has become almost a 'buzzword'. Sectarianism 'activates' itself at the grassroots level when other factors are at play - when people feel their security, safety, livelihoods and culture is under threat/attack - they will mobilise against whomever appears to be the source of that threat , whether it is Arab leaders as we saw in the Arab Spring or our own military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, through whichever actor markets themselves as protecting their interests. Sectarianism is also aided by political vacuums so various set's of elites compete for power using rhetoric and socio-economic dissatisfaction. You provide a situation in which there are opportunities for people whether it be through drafting them into the post-conflict army or developing the economic interests previously stated in my comments, there will be a substantially reduced amount of support for factions operating outside of a political system.

Cost - looking at the situation as it is, a 'political bargain' with Assad's regime is another example of short-term thinking that led to our undoing in other areas of the world.

Scenario one - Assad stays with no domestic legitimacy and Syria descends into civil war. In any case, for a political bargain to work it would require Russia and Iran to use whatever leverage they have and act a broker. In the unlikely event that Iran would come to the table, it's not in NATO states' long term interests to have Russia and Iran using their 'leverage' and maintaining influence in Syria.

Scenario two - Western states lead negotiations with the Syrian army to defect and call on Turkey to commit troops for a ground intervention. Ends civilian atrocities and creates a pro-NATO ally in the Middle-East if done carefully (not the iraq/afghanistan approach), that can be built upon to develop economic interests, and more broadly, Show pro-Hezbollah supporters at the grassroots level of society that a different actor can provide a secure and safe environment with access to long-term economic potential greater than that which Hezb and its allies can provide and delegitimises their influence.

Support for Hezbollah at the crucial level, the mass level, is about provision of security and staples, it's very different to the Hezbollah political and cultural elites supporting them that flood most of the discourse we get to see. As I explained before, they monopolise a discourse to suit their own ends - a stagnation of any movement on the Palestine issue towards the only viable option - a one state solution - by creating rhetoric that protracts it for self-interested reasons and causes average folks at the grassroots level to think a two state solution is the only way or will be in their interests. Syria is a chance to substantially undermine Hezb political and cultural elites' and the Iranian government's ability to do that.

Scenario three - No intervention and Syria descends into civil war, with Iran and Russia happy to supply arms to keep it that way and maintain their leverage. Ahmedinijad gets to maintain the Israel bugbear to remain in power domestically.

This leads me to the final point i'd like to make here:

All in all, we need to widen the variables we use to assess cost - to include, as previously stated, both our moral inclinations to intervene when laws and standards are not protecting civilians together with the mid and long-term 'benefits' that justify the capabilities, military personnel, and money involved in an operation, and how to access those benefits e.g by looking to create the right type of partnerships with those countries we have intervene in.

Libya was a short-term military success, and could have been a long-term economic success, again had long-term thinking been applied and the correct alliances made with tribal leaders in the resource rich regions of the country, not just central government focused.

June 11, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Also, dont forget: A military operation in a resource-rich country like Iraq has a whole different set of interpretations that can fuel sectarianism and civil war as compared to an intervention to remove a regime such as Assad's in a country like Syria.

This reduces the fallout in terms of sectarianism, again, if the operation is done in a responsible way, optimally with Turkey involved.

June 12, 2012

Khalid Ahmed Chaudry

" Bashar Al Assad's regime is backed by the Iranian Government and Hezbollah. A NATO intervention therefore on the one hand presents a chance to remove large stumbling blocks to long-term stability and development in the Middle East - the influence of the Ahmadinejad regime and Hezbollah"

" Therefore, for there to be a regime-change in Syria that benefits NATO states, the Allies could present negotiations that would encourage defection from the Syrian army in order for a pro-NATO opposition ground-force to emerge "

" With a weak Iran and Hezbollah, a range of opportunities and partnerships that increase NATO states' political and economic influence and interests would emerge "

" bringing countries such as Turkey on board would be viable "


" By intervening, NATO removes two of the actors, Hezbollah and Ahmadinejad's Iran, that have a vested interest in protracting tension and conflict in the region and that therefore are obstacles to the security, economic, and political interests of civilians in the region and NATO allies alike. With this in mind, there is a unique chance here to gain genuine long-term influence "

" With this in mind, there is a unique chance here to gain genuine long-term influence "

Respected Tabish Shah,

Please allow me to say few words here. It's not Hezbollah or Ahmadinejad regime responsible for the decades long Status Quo in the Middle East, but the influence, interventions of the United States of America and many member states of the European Union.They have been supporting the brutal regimes like Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussain , above all their support and free hand to Israel and then lucrative market for the export and sales of weapons.

Nobody have any right to build-up a pro-NATO opposition/ground-force in the Middle East to repeat and continue foreign interventions (first pro-NATO, pro-US, pro-Europe ruling elites and now pro-NATO ground forces!). What Middle East needs is "pro-people, pro-Middle East, pro-Peace environment . For this a sustainable and justifiable solution of Palestinian Issue is the key.

Turkey's involvement in any possible military intervention would be a disastrous scenario, not only for the Turkey but as well as for the whole middle east. Turkey should stay out in case of any military intervention.

You mentioned 'the vested interests of Hezbollah and Iran in protecting tension and conflicts in the region. I wish you could say something on the vested interest of the USA, NATO and the UK in protecting tension and conflicts in the Middle East !!!

At the end I would say foreign policies based on the objectives to gain long-term influence, can never ever be appreciated and justified, at least the history is witness to this. The world needs global partnership for the peace and justice and not "long-term influence by any nation on any nation.

Anyways, let's you and I and all of us hope for the end of miseries being faced by the people in the Middle East and elsewhere , which can only be achieved through honest and sincere attitude towards each other.

May the God Almighty bless you, the readers and the world.

The Hague, Netherlands

June 12, 2012

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

Let me add a final point. There's little to add what has been already written by Florian Broschk and Khalid Ahmed Chaudry, but I would like to comment the point "there is tendency amongst strategists to be almost overly cautious now".

Overly cautious? I would say, it about time to think twice now before the next war is staged! How many more disasters do we have to produce until we realise that the Middle East does not work as we imagine? I do not want to repeat what has previously been written by Floran and Khalid, but would like to underline that we certainly do not adequately understand the complexity of reality. Easily, you could argue for the contrary: a western intervention would further destablise Syria and the region, increase bloodshed, and therefore strengthen Hezbollah, Iran, and radicalism, and possibly provide the best possible targets for al-Qaeda style terrorists. Similarily, playing the Turkey card is touching hot iron, since it might strengthen the aspirations of groups hoping for a restoration of the Ottoman empire.

In fact, if you limit your analysis to 'shared values' and 'possible strategic partners in Syria', the Alawite and secular regime in Syria emerges as the best potential partner - as were the communists in Afghanistan, if they had not sided with the Soviets.

Last but not least, let me have a remark on Jason Naselli who "shudders to think what happens when one stops being "distracted" by children dying". Well, maybe you would start considering how many children have been killed in western air strikes in Iraq and Afghanistan, how Iraq was polluted by radiactive material and duds, still mutilating thousands of children every year. Maybe my comment was a little cynical, but please, see current images in our televisions with more caution! Dead children in Syria are, without doubt, very outrageous, but what about the dead children in Libya which you don't see? And what about the children killed by the Syrian resistance?

I say: this is the reality of a war, and there is no "clean" war. So please be more cautious with war! Don't use it to 'do something' about shocking news such as dead children, because wars produce only more horrors, and you can look at the numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan if you need proof that 'good intentions' are often the opposite of 'good'.

And, when you make strategic considerations such as those about Iran and Hezbollah influence, remember that earlier strategies born out of similar considerations failed grossly, so it would be time to question whether we really understand Middle Eastern power dynamics. Less can be more, and this time, doing 'nothing' can be the best we can do!

Most of those who comment here will not have to take personal responsibility for their decisions because we will send others to pay the bill: our soldiers. In this context I am glad that Florian Broschk shares my point of view, although the contrast of our backgrounds could not be greater, since I fundamentally oppose military 'solutions' out of the conviction that there is no 'clean' war.

Overly cautious? Be MORE cautious!

June 12, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Bernhard, about not having to take personal responsibility, that is quite an astounding assertion - we should stick to basing comments on the situation, not guesswork regarding the personal biographies of authors.

I've answered most of your points - i would say re-read the article and the comments; it's about practical solutions based on what options are available that in NATO States' interests and civilians interests. We don't need to re-state that in conflicts their are casualties, that's why it should always be the very last option and should be done with the correct tactics in a responsible and careful way to minimise that. Doing so is not only right but in our interests - carelessness shown in Iraq and Afghanistan severely affected NATO influence there.

The point is, none of the considerations put forward above regarding sectarianism and mobilisation were made, nor was Turkey able to be involved, and we have those responsible for failed strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq and currently implementing that strategy in Afghanistan now overly-hesitant to make decisions at all. Just because all theatres we're talking about involve military action doesn't mean anywhere near the same dynamics are involved.

Ahmed, thanks for your comment - i've replied to another article on here and my comment answers your points: http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Legitimizing_...

June 12, 2012

Jason Naselli, University of Essex, Platinum Contributor (208)

Bernhard,

There is no doubt that military action should be the absolute last resort. And yes, there is certainly no such thing as a "clean" war. But when you are faced with the prospect of mass killing, is standing aside really a better option? There have been unfortunate incidents in Libya, but would letting Gaddafi slaughter the people of Benghazi have been any better?

You bring up Iraq and Afghanistan, but my comment had nothing to do with those; we should never have been in Iraq and be out of Afghanistan. But I believe that it would be far worse to let the legacy of these misguided wars continue to hold a shadow over legitimate instances where humanitarian intervention might be needed.

You say you "fundamentally oppose" military solutions; does this mean you think the Balkans are worse off for the NATO operations in the 90s?

Both in the comments here and in Paul Smyth's article, the alternative option posed on Syria seems to be striking a deal with the regime. But it seems highly unlikely that the regime could provide the stability you seek now that it has become the direct enemy of much of its people. Perhaps months ago, this could have been a strategy to prevent open violence. But it's already happening, and Assad is not responding to sanctions and calls for a ceasefire.

Florian sums up well many reasons why an intervention would be messy and potentially more harmful. If indeed there is no option but to "do nothing", it should be a cause for sadness, not to congratulate each other on restraint.

June 13, 2012

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

Jason,

on the one hand you argue that using military force "should be the absolute last resort", but on the other hand, you assume that if such an intervention is not to take place, it means that "there is no option but to "do nothing" which should be a cause for sadness".

Sounds pretty contradictory for me. If you are serious about the military being the "absolute last resort", you should not be so quick to call for it. Certainly, burning cities look more impressive in the TV and give more the impression that "something is done", perhaps in the style of 'Terminator' Hollywood movies where good destroys evil, but the question remains if these deeds are of any good in the real world.

Much has been done and is being done in the political scene and we should not disregard that. Even though it might not be possible to stop the suffering of Syrians rapidly, the positive message is that it might be possible to control the conflict on a limited scale, and that on the long run, political concessions and a development towards more democracy can be negotiated with the Assad regime.

For me, that sounds much better than a regional war, especially for the Syrian people, but I'm afraid that pictures of negotiations in the TV are not so impressive and might be used to infer that 'nothing is being done about Syria'.

June 13, 2012

Bernhard Lucke, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, Platinum Contributor (531)

just a last comment regarding Libya: I think it was right to stop Gaddafi in Benghazi and argued accordingly in the forum. However, playing the air force of the rebels in the later conflict was wrong - and I wrote exactly this.

Staying within the limits of the UN-mandate in Libya might have forced the Gaddafi regime to work out a political compromise with the rebels. Very likely, that would have been better that the current power vaccuum, not to speak about the damage to the trust of Russia and China. To some degree, Syrians might now have to suffer for that, but I would still argue that respecting international law should still be more important than finding faster solutions for individual conflicts.

June 13, 2012

Jason Naselli, University of Essex, Platinum Contributor (208)

I guess I am not convinced that political concessions can be negotiated with the Assad regime... not any more. Perhaps if the international community was more serious about deploying peacekeepers earlier in a conflict, there might be the potential for the kind of conflict control you are looking for.

Instead, what tends to happen is they wait until situations have gotten completely out of hand, and there comes a point of no return. I am all for limited intervention, but it needs to happen earlier so that it would be credible.

And here is the point: the longer the conflict goes on, the more chances there are for opinion to get behind an intervention. And if that happens, well, you've got all the problems you've already mentioned, PLUS you are now that much further down the road, there have been that many more weapons imported into Syria, there have been that many more people killed. So if it is going to happen anyway, it would be better for it to happen sooner rather than later.

Final clarification: Yes, being unable to help people who are being killed should be upsetting. If there are diplomatic ways to prevent this, great. But the Annan mission to Syria has so far been a big waste of time; Assad shows no indication of taking it the least bit seriously. So what is "being done on the political scene" that we should be waiting for, that is going to be more effective?

June 14, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Just to add to the pertinent points above by Jason, it is not an 'either/or' scenario with regards to combining our interests with doing what is right; both are vital to gaining genuine influence. If sentiment, as it has been put in Paul Smyth's article, were outweighing responsibility to our own states we'd be calling for intervention in a host of countries.

June 18, 2012

Tabish Shah, University of Warwick, Gold Contributor (113)

Firstly, thanks for all your responses. Interesting counterpoints have been raised but they have only been based on assertions. If an achievable evidence-based non-military solution to the Syrian problem was proposed I would support that.

To sum up:

1) I have proposed we merge interests with values to negotiate for defection of Syrian troops; the inclusion of Turkey with a substantial amount of responsibility within any intervention that takes place to circumvent issues of sectarianism or radicals having legitimacy in post-conflict politics. In response to concerns about Syria becoming an Afghanistan or Iraq, I also explained how the process of sectarianism works and warned against its overuse and use as a buzzword since Iraq and Afghanistan, and also for context to be understood - Syria has no natural resources and a NATO intervention to end civilian casualties involving Turkey makes it nearly impossible for interpretations that fuel mass level support for sectarian militia elites. Without commenting on the wrongness or rightness of those two operations, I explained why Iraq and Afghanistan were strategic failures once there and what to do to avoid the same pitfalls. I have stated that it is in our strategic interests to do so to allow for broader ME goals to be achievable and that way operations are carried out has an impact on the post-war influence you have and outlined practical ways for NATO allies to pursue that. I have not mentioned the Balkans, i think you're confused between myself and Jason Naselli's point.

2) The issues you have raised concerning law, although very important, do not move the discussion forward until you or someone else can rectify the core problem with international law at present - the fact that there is no way to implement the law itself legally. How to create a mechanism by which international law can actually be upheld is important and requires long-term consideration; however it is a theoretical discussion in this context and one that does not move things forward in Syria - which is now 15 months and counting.

3) Pursuing a political solution was suggested, but again without a blueprint on how to go about reaching a sustainable one. Allowing Ahmedinijad's Iran and the Russian Gov't to maintain their foothold is an obstacle to NATO states' long-term interests. In any case, Al-Assad has no legitimacy, the Iranian gov't are not going to the table, and with Russia now delivering attack helicopters which al-Assad is using on civilians, a viable political bargain is highly unlikely.