Stratfor's geopolitical chief-analyst Robert D. Kaplan was recently
ranked 82nd place of Foreign Policy´s "Top
100 Global Thinkers". His ideas about the Balkans and Asia have
significantly influenced the policies of US administrations. In 2010
("Monsoon"), Kaplan highlighted the importance of the Indian Ocean in the
future - a theme caught by the Obama administration´s "Asia-pivot"-strategy. In
his new book, "The
Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the
Battle Against Fate", Kaplan surveys contemporary global politics to
illustrate his thesis: geography matters. Kaplan´s tools to illustrate his
point are relief maps, population studies, travelling experiences, a thorough
research of history, geography and economics along with discussions of classical
geopolitical thinkers.
Kaplan is sufficiently cautious about the limitations of his ideas that
he is, in the end, able to make a convincing-if limited argument "for a modest
acceptance of fate, secured ultimately in the facts of geography, in order to
curb excessive zeal in foreign policy". Rejecting determinism or historical
inevitability, he emphasizes the limitations of human actions in order to show
realistic options for deliberate action. While Kaplan used to be a supporter of
the Iraq invasion, he recalls himself as an example of overconfidence in military
superiority for humanitarian means. The main illustration for the "revenge" of
geographical facts is the road from Bosnia to Baghdad: "The Balkan
interventions [...] appeared to justify the idealistic approach to foreign
policy", while "Iraq was a continuation of the passions of the 1990s", but
"represented, however subconsciously, either the defeat for geography or the
utter disregard of it". In Iraq, the misconception of the nature of the desert
landscape and how "terrain-specific" militias operated lured the US
military into a quagmire. The facts of the map, he goes, might seem harsh and
uncompromising, or undermine faith in moral universalism - but if we are aware
of them "counterintuitively, we need not always be bounded by it."
Kaplan discusses the classics H. Morgenthau, H. J. Mackinder, N. J.
Spykman, A. T. Mahan, the concepts of landpower and seapower and the Nazi distortion
of geopolitics (Lebensraumpolitik) in
sufficient length and detail. The central chapter in this section is "The
Crisis of Room", in which Kaplan develops his own argument in depth - and
thereby makes clear that he does not see geography and geopolitics as an unchanging
historical truth, but one that has assumed new qualities in the modern world.
The relief map, he argues, had appeared less important because of technological
advancements in communication and transportation. New phenomena remind us that
geography is still important, but in new ways: he discusses, for example, new
domains of conflict, like the cyberspace or new weapon technologies (e.g.
longer missile ranges), the rise of megacities and other demographic hubs or
youth bulges. He asserts that these spatial phenomena have a corresponding
influence on people´s inner dispositions - most of all: fear. By this, he is able to show the social
appropriation of spatial facts in societies and thereby argues that ideology
plays an important role. He concludes that "[Asia] is getting more
claustrophobic because of the expansion of both populations and missile ranges;
it is becoming more volatile, because of the accumulation of weaponry without concomitant
alliance structures."
Kaplan´s treatment, in particular, of Russia, the US, China, India, and
the Middle East may be applauded or criticized as necessary without deeming his
central argument irrelevant. For example, his treatment of the "Iranian pivot"
is an example of the strength of Kaplan´s analysis, whereas his grasp of the former
Ottoman Empire is weaker. In his view, the Islamic Republic is no genuine
expression of the historical heritage of Persian culture or its geographical
position. Rather, he suggests hope in the Green Movement and the liberalism of
Iran´s rich philosophical tradition to break through against the current
theocratic zeal. On the other hand, he makes important observations about the
contradictory character of the early Kemalist Turkish Republic, but lacks
insight into the character of the contemporary clashes between religion and the
nation-state paradigm, pluralism and pan-Turkism. In the end he lends too much support to the
ostensible logic of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. A more accurate
portrait would compass the ad hoc, inconsistent nature of Turkey's recent
policy, and note that the changes in this region were unanticipated by Turkish
policy makers, who appeared unable to respond to them knowledgably or
competently. Political Geography offers no real logic or shows inevitable
developments, but rather, and this is Kaplan´s point, a good sense of the
choices individuals and nations face.
A more significant point of critique is to be found elsewhere. The
strength of Kaplan´s argument lies in its vicious but balanced down-to-earth
reminder against academic blueprints of world affairs. Yet he plays "realism"
as an IR theory against a weakly discussed "idealism". While all good theories
should be explanatory as towards the real world, realism is not realistic by
definition. A good reality-based account is measured by its explanatory power.
The strength of the geography argument lies in its modesty and balance, but the
placement of realism as an en passant attack on "idealistic" neoconservatives or liberal interventionists has weak
support. What Kaplan attributes to these people is often a caricature and not
developed in detail, let alone fixed by a name of who he means. If one is to
make a case in the overall IR theory debate it would make for a more powerful
argument to take on influential thinkers instead of attacking strawmen.
In the last part, he comes up with a central call for change in American
foreign policy: "fixing Mexico is more important than fixing Afghanistan".
Mexico´s demography and political instability is the most central and immediate
challenge for the United States. In order to meet the future challenges in the
Middle East or South- and Central-Asia from stable ground, the "grand strategy"
Kaplan envisions is "Mexico first": "A stable and prosperous Mexico, working in
organic concert with the United States, would be an unbeatable combination in
geopolitics." The Mexico-claim builds flawless on the points he made about
geographic realism in foreign policy.
Conclusively, while particular assessments or claims as towards specific regions are debatable, the central
argument ("bring geography back in") is developed elegantly and vividly
illustrated. The less developed critique of other disciplines does not account
for a weakness in the argument. Rather, it could and would be more powerful and
fruitful if it had followed from Kaplan´s balanced and at the same time snappy
reassessment of the realistic choices people face in the future. In the end,
Kaplan is far from declaring idealism pure ideology. History is made by people
and ideals are a reality of human action. Or in his own words: "realism without
a measure of idealism is unrealistic".
Niklas Anzinger is a student of
Philosophy & Economics (B.A.) at the University of Bayreuth. He has worked
as an Editorial Assistant for Turkish Policy Quarterly in Istanbul.
Stratfor's geopolitical chief-analyst Robert D. Kaplan was recently
ranked 82nd place of Foreign Policy´s "Top
100 Global Thinkers". His ideas about the Balkans and Asia have
significantly influenced the policies of US administrations. In 2010
("Monsoon"), Kaplan highlighted the importance of the Indian Ocean in the
future - a theme caught by the Obama administration´s "Asia-pivot"-strategy. In
his new book, "The
Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the
Battle Against Fate", Kaplan surveys contemporary global politics to
illustrate his thesis: geography matters. Kaplan´s tools to illustrate his
point are relief maps, population studies, travelling experiences, a thorough
research of history, geography and economics along with discussions of classical
geopolitical thinkers.
Kaplan is sufficiently cautious about the limitations of his ideas that
he is, in the end, able to make a convincing-if limited argument "for a modest
acceptance of fate, secured ultimately in the facts of geography, in order to
curb excessive zeal in foreign policy". Rejecting determinism or historical
inevitability, he emphasizes the limitations of human actions in order to show
realistic options for deliberate action. While Kaplan used to be a supporter of
the Iraq invasion, he recalls himself as an example of overconfidence in military
superiority for humanitarian means. The main illustration for the "revenge" of
geographical facts is the road from Bosnia to Baghdad: "The Balkan
interventions [...] appeared to justify the idealistic approach to foreign
policy", while "Iraq was a continuation of the passions of the 1990s", but
"represented, however subconsciously, either the defeat for geography or the
utter disregard of it". In Iraq, the misconception of the nature of the desert
landscape and how "terrain-specific" militias operated lured the US
military into a quagmire. The facts of the map, he goes, might seem harsh and
uncompromising, or undermine faith in moral universalism - but if we are aware
of them "counterintuitively, we need not always be bounded by it."
Kaplan discusses the classics H. Morgenthau, H. J. Mackinder, N. J.
Spykman, A. T. Mahan, the concepts of landpower and seapower and the Nazi distortion
of geopolitics (Lebensraumpolitik) in
sufficient length and detail. The central chapter in this section is "The
Crisis of Room", in which Kaplan develops his own argument in depth - and
thereby makes clear that he does not see geography and geopolitics as an unchanging
historical truth, but one that has assumed new qualities in the modern world.
The relief map, he argues, had appeared less important because of technological
advancements in communication and transportation. New phenomena remind us that
geography is still important, but in new ways: he discusses, for example, new
domains of conflict, like the cyberspace or new weapon technologies (e.g.
longer missile ranges), the rise of megacities and other demographic hubs or
youth bulges. He asserts that these spatial phenomena have a corresponding
influence on people´s inner dispositions - most of all: fear. By this, he is able to show the social
appropriation of spatial facts in societies and thereby argues that ideology
plays an important role. He concludes that "[Asia] is getting more
claustrophobic because of the expansion of both populations and missile ranges;
it is becoming more volatile, because of the accumulation of weaponry without concomitant
alliance structures."
Kaplan´s treatment, in particular, of Russia, the US, China, India, and
the Middle East may be applauded or criticized as necessary without deeming his
central argument irrelevant. For example, his treatment of the "Iranian pivot"
is an example of the strength of Kaplan´s analysis, whereas his grasp of the former
Ottoman Empire is weaker. In his view, the Islamic Republic is no genuine
expression of the historical heritage of Persian culture or its geographical
position. Rather, he suggests hope in the Green Movement and the liberalism of
Iran´s rich philosophical tradition to break through against the current
theocratic zeal. On the other hand, he makes important observations about the
contradictory character of the early Kemalist Turkish Republic, but lacks
insight into the character of the contemporary clashes between religion and the
nation-state paradigm, pluralism and pan-Turkism. In the end he lends too much support to the
ostensible logic of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. A more accurate
portrait would compass the ad hoc, inconsistent nature of Turkey's recent
policy, and note that the changes in this region were unanticipated by Turkish
policy makers, who appeared unable to respond to them knowledgably or
competently. Political Geography offers no real logic or shows inevitable
developments, but rather, and this is Kaplan´s point, a good sense of the
choices individuals and nations face.
A more significant point of critique is to be found elsewhere. The
strength of Kaplan´s argument lies in its vicious but balanced down-to-earth
reminder against academic blueprints of world affairs. Yet he plays "realism"
as an IR theory against a weakly discussed "idealism". While all good theories
should be explanatory as towards the real world, realism is not realistic by
definition. A good reality-based account is measured by its explanatory power.
The strength of the geography argument lies in its modesty and balance, but the
placement of realism as an en passant attack on "idealistic" neoconservatives or liberal interventionists has weak
support. What Kaplan attributes to these people is often a caricature and not
developed in detail, let alone fixed by a name of who he means. If one is to
make a case in the overall IR theory debate it would make for a more powerful
argument to take on influential thinkers instead of attacking strawmen.
In the last part, he comes up with a central call for change in American
foreign policy: "fixing Mexico is more important than fixing Afghanistan".
Mexico´s demography and political instability is the most central and immediate
challenge for the United States. In order to meet the future challenges in the
Middle East or South- and Central-Asia from stable ground, the "grand strategy"
Kaplan envisions is "Mexico first": "A stable and prosperous Mexico, working in
organic concert with the United States, would be an unbeatable combination in
geopolitics." The Mexico-claim builds flawless on the points he made about
geographic realism in foreign policy.
Conclusively, while particular assessments or claims as towards specific regions are debatable, the central
argument ("bring geography back in") is developed elegantly and vividly
illustrated. The less developed critique of other disciplines does not account
for a weakness in the argument. Rather, it could and would be more powerful and
fruitful if it had followed from Kaplan´s balanced and at the same time snappy
reassessment of the realistic choices people face in the future. In the end,
Kaplan is far from declaring idealism pure ideology. History is made by people
and ideals are a reality of human action. Or in his own words: "realism without
a measure of idealism is unrealistic".
Niklas Anzinger is a student of
Philosophy & Economics (B.A.) at the University of Bayreuth. He has worked
as an Editorial Assistant for Turkish Policy Quarterly in Istanbul.
- 1
January 3, 2013
Olga Papadopoulou, University of the Aegean, Bronze Contributor (25)
First of all, congratulations for this excellent book review. Definitely, I will buy "The Revenge of Geography" .
Indeed "Geography matters" as D.Massey stated. Geography studies can give a more integrated approach of natural and social phenomena that take place in space and time,such as global environmental change and migration, urbanization and suburbanization, industrialization and deindustrialization, to name a few of them.
Additionally central concern of a Geographer is not only the analysis, understanding and interpretation of the spatial distribution of natural or social characteristics, but also the relationship between environment, economy and society.
Last but not least and since Kaplan is one of my favorites authors, I would like to recommend one of his books "Balkan Ghosts" for a better understanding of Balkan and its people.