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July 26, 2012 |  6 comments |  Print  Your Opinion  

Shalva  Dzidziguri

The Race for Eastern Europe: Russia vs. the EU

Shalva Dzidziguri: Russia’s relationship with the West has never been easy. With the end of Cold War-era animosity, Russia has continuously sought reassurance that its Soviet-inherited geopolitical interests are protected. Ironically, EU policy might be helping Russia realize its potential in the region.

Russia has been alarmed by what it perceives as expansionism by NATO and the US into Eastern Europe and into countries it views as part of its sphere of influence. Although perceived as a ‘lesser evil', the EU followed the footsteps of NATO by expanding eastwardly. For those countries who remained outside the union's frontier, it initiated "The Eastern Partnership" (EaP), a policy program aimed at exporting the values of the EU and developing strong political, economic and cultural cooperation with six states (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia), though without promising them perspective membership . Since its inception, the EaP has become a contentious issue between the EU and Russia, for Russia perceives the EU's eastern expansion as a direct threat to its hegemony in the post-Soviet space.

Eurasian Economic Union (EurAsEC)

The recent return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency was far from unexpected. Moreover, he has always been regarded as an unofficial head of state, despite letting Dmitry Medvedev hold his presidential position for the last five years. It may seem that everything has gone according to plan and that the EU should have prepared well for the predictable change in Russian policy.

After a controversial presidential election, Moscow immediately initiated a new multinational union. EurAsEC, often referred to as a "quasi-European Union", is meant to ensure the creation of a single market in the former Soviet region that will bolster the free movement of goods and services. It will also create an EU-like joint security sphere by developing the military capabilities of its member states. This union, which is Putin's brainchild, will serve to reinvigorate Russia's hegemony in the region. Although skeptics argue that this union does not have a future given that Russia's current economic capabilities largely fall behind its ambitions, several weeks ago the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine gathered in Moscow and declared 2015 as the year of the union's birth.

EaP vs. EurAsEC

While the EU puts significant emphasis on the economic aspects of bilateral relations as a promotion of its normative expansion, this endeavor does not afford time for complacency. The EU needs to engage more constructively with its eastern neighbors to avoid a situation where these states turn increasingly towards Russia.

Let's take Moldova and Georgia. Both countries have long declared their aspirations to integrate into the EU and have honed all efforts towards doing so, the processes of which have rightly earned them the status of "EaP-forerunners". Nevertheless, the top priorities of both countries remain the restoration of their territorial integrity and the establishment of a stable and secure environment without which their further development is questionable.

Therefore, if the EU does not change its approach to the conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, and instead of trying to maintain the status quo, summons political will and applies a more pro-active approach to its resolution, the current fragile situation on the ground, notably in Abkhazia/South Ossetia, and the presence of the limited-capability missions will not be able to prevent the re-escalation of instability.

The risk that these states will revert to the Russian orbit any time soon is still significant given that Russia plays an instrumental role in their conflicts. Furthermore, Russia represents an attractive marketplace in which quality requirements, unlike in the highly competitive and saturated EU market, are not difficult to meet with most low-quality Moldavian and Georgian production. Moldova already stands as an observer within the EurAsEC, confirming its interest to accelerate economic ties with its member states.

Also, in spite of the existing tension and the suspicions of Georgia's mainstream political actors towards Russia, there is consensus in Tbilisi that restoration of relations between the countries will substantially promote Georgia's sustainable economic growth. Negotiations between the Georgian businessmen and the Russian authorities are ongoing and might result in the re-opening of the world's 11th biggest market for Georgian production.

Lastly, Russia's traditional "hard power" policy towards its neighbors leaves little chance for the EU's "soft" approach to succeed. Manipulation with unsettled conflicts has always been Russia's leverage point vis-à-vis the EU's longtime presence in Moldova and Georgia. The Eurasian Union might fail to achieve its foundational goals as its predecessor's alliances in the post-Soviet space did, but it will obviously continue to serve Russia's agenda to impose its own will on both countries.

Shalva Dzidziguri is the member of the Atlantic Council's Young Atlanticist NATO Working Group.

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Carmine  Finelli

July 28, 2012

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Thank you Shalva for your interesting contribution. I agree eith you on the core issue of your analysis, but what do you think about the difficult relations between Russia and Ukraina and Russia and Georgia? Kiev has a key role in the distrubution of the Russian gas that is the main part of Russia "hard power". I think the European Eastern partnership goes in the right direction to weaken the influence Russia has on the East European states. Think for example to Poland, now a bulwark of freedom and democracy. Are you really sure that the EU policy teaards eastern Europe could help Russia to regain leverage in the area?
 
Shalva  Dzidziguri

July 29, 2012

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Dear Carmine,

Thank you very much for your comment! Here are some of my thoughts about your questions:

It would be a mistake to declare unanimously the Eastern Partnership initiative as a total failure. It is clear that Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are doing quite well to deepen cooperation with EU on various issues. It is also noteworthy to mention that the hidden agenda of the EaP was to detach the six post-Soviet countries ultimately from the Russian influence; however, I claim that the EU does not do enough to achieve that goal.

There two main weak points which make this EU eastern neighborhood policy rather ineffective, about which even the EaP countries do not shy away to complain:

• First, it is a lack of a membership perspective. Despite a hard attempt of the polish government, the main driver of the EaP, to add a membership reward as a strong incentive of this initiative, with an insistence of more powerful EU members (Germany among others) fearing of confrontation with Russia, had to exclude it, which substantially downgraded attractiveness and future effectiveness of this project.

• Second, placing Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in the same EaP “basket” with Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia, that have no intention whatsoever to integrate deeply with the Union calls into question the effectiveness of the EU’s preferable regional approaches towards its neighbors.

Also, remember the recent EU summit in Warsaw fell short to achieve tangible results on the Belorussian issue! Ukraine, Moldova and all South Caucasian states unanimously stepped off to join the declaration aiming to impose more restrictive measures on Belarus’ pariah president. Concurrently, the Yulia Timoshenko case strained a relationship with another neighbor, Ukraine, resulting in a cancellation of the EU–Ukrainian Summit.

As for your question with regard to the current Ukraine – Russia’s lukewarm relationship and Georgian – Russian animosity, do you really think it is because of the EU and the EaP?
 
Carmine  Finelli

July 31, 2012

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Dear Shelva,
thank you very much to have shared your thoughts with me. Just to clarify: I don't believe the relations between Russia and Ukraine and the animosity of the latter with Georgia depends on the EaP. I was saying that because of these difficult relations if the EU choose to stand on the Georgian and Ukraine side it will contribute to deepen the russian levarage in the area, as you stated in your insightful article.
Thank you Shelva.
 
Tabatha  Robinson

August 3, 2012

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Thank you for your article, Shelva. I also thought you made a strong case for your point. Given the strengths of the Eurasian Economic Union and the weakness in the EU's Eastern Partnership policies, I can see how EU policy might be pushing Eastern European States towards the former.

I'm curious about your personal opinion. Which union do you think would best serve these 6 states? I imagine that there is no blanket program that would cover the needs of all of them. Can you point to any specific policies in either union that would work to the advantage of one country and to the disadvantage of another? How then would the union mediate that?
 
Shalva  Dzidziguri

August 9, 2012

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Thank you guys for having time to review my short article!

To answer your questions and further expand my view on the EaP initiative, I would like underline that the current state of the EU’s eastern neighborhood policy is far from desirable.

In my view (as other experts argue too), in order to become more effective the EaP needs to incorporate at least two very significant changes in its approach towards six eastern neighbor countries:

• First, it should offer a membership perspective, which will induce even the most reluctant country to revitalize its integration toward the EU. The EU can follow NATO’s example and introduce “Open door policy”, without specific timeline of membership perspective though.

• Second, it should make differentiation among the EaP countries. I think this is really vital because some countries’ individual strive towards the EU (For example Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) is sometimes hindered by multilateral relations. Again, here can be used an example of NATO and put the EaP forerunner countries in the group of “EU aspirants”.

You might ask me “What about Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia?” I think these countries need individual approach until they decide that their future lies within the EU.
 
Felix Adrian Moldovan

August 30, 2012

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Dear Shalva, Tabatha and Carmine,

Thank you for your very interesting views.

Shalva, I agree with your idea that the EU is in some way pushing Eastern European countries towards Russia. You had a very strong point when you described the lack of economic preparedness of Gerorgian or Moldavian products to enter the EU market. This is undeniably a major problem that lies in the middle. The question I would like to ask is, if you think that entering the Russian market would better serve the interests of these countries in the long run. Although it is not saturated to the point the EU market is, it is still mostly controlled by the Kremlin and corruption is still a major problem. For those countries, who seek to embark on a more democratic path I believe it is still better to wait for deepening realtions with the EU and plan a long term strategy with it, than to make certain compromises now, that would hinder their democratic aspirations.

That being said, I also agree with the discrepancy between Russia's hard power and the EU's soft power. As you said, any attempt from the EU to get closer to these countries will be percieved as a threat to Russia's sphere of influence. We all remember how they reacted when the shut the gas pipes off and nearly half of Ukraine froze. Walking the line between holding up the normative principles and values the EU represents and looking after one's own self interest is always very difficult. I think the EU is playing the waiting game until it can free itself, at least partially, from its dependence on Russian energy. Even then the situation would be difficult but at least they will have more room for manouver. Let's just hope they won't wait for too long.
 

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