Grounded on a small Alawite minority, the Assad Regime
suffers an intrinsic weakness it has repeatedly exacerbated through its own
actions. In the early days of the
current crisis it reacted disproportionately to peaceful protests and later, as
conflict ensued, its indiscriminate employment of military power and the use of
barbaric shabiha militias offended much of the countryʼs large Sunni
majority. Despite itʼs need for wider
support the Regime has consistently alienated those beyond itʼs narrow
base.
Of course, not all of the Shia Muslims (Alawites or Druze)
and Christians in Syria supported or support Assad, but as rebel groups driven
by Sunni (Salafi) Islamist fervour exert a growing influence in Syria, these
minorities feel increasingly endangered by the prospect of Assadʼs demise. Similarly, moderate Sunnis who sought liberal
reforms may fear the revolution is being hijacked by religious extremists. A popular revolt seeking political freedoms
has become a civil war in which democratic objectives are increasingly
sidelined. For women, liberals and
religious minorities, life after Assad may not bring progress, but
regression.
As the crisis has morphed from a pursuit of democracy into a
competition for Syriaʼs future, sectarian identities, loyalties, beliefs, goals
and motivations have become more important.
Critically, this means that overthrowing Assad is no longer an end of
itself but a means to an end. While the
current conflict is between the Regime and rebel groups, it is cultivating a
growing antipathy among segments of the population that will outlive Assadʼs
rule and create a problem for the UK and other foreign governments.
Illogically, some Western states did not adopt a neutral
stance on the Syrian crisis but swiftly sided with the opposition
movement. Whilst they should
understandably support foreign democratic aspirations and movements they could
have done so without overtly taking sides.
Advocacy does not demand alignment yet very early in the crisis senior
Western politicians called for Assadʼs removal and effectively threatened him
with legal repercussions, neither of which promoted Regime restraint or the
peace Syrians desperately needed.
When international NGOs work in states suffering civil war
they zealously guard their impartiality.
That Western governments did not replicate that attitude in Syria
suggests their primary aim was not to achieve peace but to facilitate regime
change. By calling very early in the
crisis for Assadʼs departure when there was no obvious successor to his rule
was manifest myopia. What might follow
the Assad dynasty is perhaps clearer now but it raises more concerns than
assurances.
The growing international recognition of the new Syrian
National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate
representative of the Syrian people is an understandable attempt in foreign
capitals to produce a political body that can provide alternative rule in Damascus,
act as a conduit for overseas support and bring rebel fighters under civilian
control. However, welcome progress
beyond the previous mistake of prematurely endorsing the emigre-rich Syrian
National Council does not guarantee those roles will be met.
For instance, endorsement by London, Paris and Washington
brings international credibility but it is not a magic wand that simply removes
the plethora of issues on which the National Council will have to agree if it is
to govern Syria. After decades of
dictatorship Syria lacks the political legacy, democratic experience,
parliamentary culture and liberal discourse needed to resolve those
issues. This is a new political chapter
for the Syrian people and it would be naive to expect rapid progress toward
effective governance.
The dwindling territory under Regime control, repeated rebel
victories and the reported firing of SCUD missiles may indicate that Assadʼs
demise will happen sooner rather than later.
If so, alarm bells should be ringing in Western capitals as Assadʼs
departure would create a vacuum the National Coalition is not ready or able to
fill. In that case, rebel fighters who
feel responsible for Assadʼs defeat would likely claim the right to influence what
happens next in Syria.
As some of the most effective rebel units are Islamist
groups with jihadist aims there is obvious potential for a post-Assad power
struggle. Their success on the
battlefield, willingness to employ suicide tactics and use of foreign recruits
with experience of other conflicts means they could readily contend with the
larger, more moderate, but heterogeneous Free Syrian Army (FSA).
Having sided so clearly with the National Coalition, Western
nations would be obliged to support it in any post-Assad fight for control of
the Syrian state, and especially for the custody of any unsecured Weapons of
Mass Destruction. That support might
willingly involve providing the FSA with weapons, training and operational
advice, but if extremists gained the upper hand in a civil war the pressure to
deploy Western military assets to Syria to support the Coalition would
naturally build. Failure to do so would
really constitute the ʻabandonmentʼ Western states have unreasonably been
accused of hitherto.
Western governments may find themselves ʻboxed inʼ having
aligned themselves too closely with the National Coalition to allow it to fail,
and having to consider military intervention that would be highly unwelcome
among their domestic populations. This
political dilemma would be entirely self-inflicted. A less partisan approach that placed much
greater emphasis on achieving peace and put concerted pressure on Gulf states
to not arm the rebels would have impeded the spread of violence in Syria,
slowed the exodus of refugees to neighbouring states, provided greater opportunity
for negotiation and more time for an alternative political body to prepare for government. Unfortunately, that approach lost out to a
fixation with removing Assad from power.
In conclusion, the collapse of the Assad regime will leave
sectarian scars on Syria. If moderate actors
quickly take the reigns in Damascus the chances of a peaceful aftermath to the
current civil war are improved. However,
if Assad falls before an effective alternative government is available, a power
vacuum may exist in which conflict continues and Islamist groups seek to rule
the country. In such a scenario Western
states would be obliged to actively support their pro-democracy ally and if
extremists gained the upper hand then the spectre of military interventions in
Iraq and Afghanistan would again loom large.
Paul Smyth has 30 years'
association with the defense arena, as a military officer and later as a Head
of Program at the Royal United Services Institute. He is currently the owner of
R3I
Consulting.
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