It seems clear that at least on Turkey's side three existing
lines of policy will remain: support for the Syrian opposition will be
unaffected; efforts to coalesce a stronger regional, Western and
international response to the Syrian crisis will continue; and Ankara
will not be drawn into an intervention or armed conflict with Syria
alone. Whether Damascus follows up its provocative June 22 attack with
further destabilizing actions remains to be seen-and will determine
whether the Syrian crisis has in fact made the transition toward wider
regional violence or remains more largely confined at home.
The Turkish authorities have been coy on the F-4's mission, but put
out detailed flight path information that show the aircraft flew well
out into the Eastern Mediterranean before approaching toward the Syrian
coast and then disaster. Syrian officials have challenged this, but the
Turkish account is presumably corroborated by US and Allied
intelligence collected by the NATO Combined Air Operations Commands in
the region and US ships in the area. Reading through the reported
sequence of events, it seems highly likely that at least on the Turkish
side, no one in a position of authority woke up on the morning of the
June 22 asking himself what the Turkish military could do to provoke
Syria; the flight's trajectory would seem to reflect otherwise.
Whether Syria's firing on the F-4 was an intentional or pre-planned
poke in the Turkish eye is harder to know. One can speculate that
Damascus wanted to warn the Erdogan government not to allow the
apparently unfettered aid that Syrian rebels are receiving in Turkey to
continue and that the F-4 was, no pun intended, a target of opportunity.
Regardless, the reaction by Damascus-fatal shots fired without
warning-certainly had the same effect that a premeditated and thoroughly
intentional action would have had.
The Erdogan government's handling of the crisis reflects what is now a
decade's worth of experience in prudent crisis management. A
considerable amount of time was taken for the government to piece
together what the F-4 was doing, where it went, and what happened.
Erdogan himself engaged in intense internal consultations with military
commanders over the weekend and by chairing a formal cabinet meeting on
Monday, June 25 that was addressed by, among others, the military's
chief of air operations. To convey unity, Erdogan consulted personally
(and publicly) with opposition leaders, including an extraordinarily
rare meeting with leaders of the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP) that he himself has vilified extensively for alleged
associations with terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Erdogan's
public remarks were tough, but surprisingly non-belligerent given his
tendency to use extreme rhetoric from time to time. Having worked
through that, the government sent a strong protest to the senior Syrian
diplomat still in the country, the Syrian consul general in Istanbul,
called for Article 4 consultations with its NATO allies, and made its
case at the UN, as well.
Rumors circulated some months ago that Ankara was informally seeking
Article 4 consultations among NATO members on the situation in Syria.
It may not have pushed the matter formally given uncertainty over
whether the Allies would agree, a development that would have completely
negated the point of the exercise, which was to put more pressure on
Damascus and showcase at least some semblance of Alliance unity on the
crisis. The F-4 downing provided the mechanism for Ankara to overcome
any objections. The statement that followed the North Atlantic Council
meeting on June 26 is a strong, but not threatening or bellicose one.
It condemned the Syrian action, expressed strong support for Alliance
member Turkey, and signaled that NATO and its members will continue to
follow the situation closely.
In Ankara the same day, Erdogan declared that the rules of engagement
with Syria have changed and that henceforth the armed forces of that
country should be regarded as a military threat. The effect of this
statement is two-fold. First, it constitutes a stern warning that
further Syrian actions against Turkey and Turkish interests, including
the now widely-reported if officially-denied support that Syrian rebels
are receiving support via Turkey, will be met by a forceful response.
Second, the new rules of engagement likely signal clearer civilian
government oversight of Turkish military operations anywhere near the
Syrian border and therefore in harm's way. Erdogan may be telling his
own military not to provoke Syria-or at least not to do so in perhaps
unintended ways and/or in the absence of clear government authorization.
It seems likely that this phase of the crisis is now largely over.
Indeed, one Turkish columnist has already penned an article on it
entitled "A Well-Managed Crisis Has Been Overcome." What remains to be
seen is whether Syria follows up its June 22 provocation with further
actions intended either to deter additional Turkish support for the
Syrian opposition or signal to Ankara and other regional capitals that
further pressure on it will bring with it the costs of wider violence
and conflagration.
Ross Wilson is director of the Dinu
Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council and former United States
ambassador to Turkey (2005-08) and Azerbaijan (2000-03). This article was published first by the Atlantic Council.
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